



 THREE APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND 





(M. A. Wu Han University, China 
B.Sc. Xi’an Jiao Tong University, China) 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 







I would like to express my gratitude to all those who gave me the possibility to complete 
this thesis.  First of all, I am deeply indebted to my two supervisors: Dr. Sang-Yong Tom 
Lee and Dr. Ivan Png, for their insightful guidance, sustained support and generous help.   
 
Four years ago, my oral English was so poor that I almost could not finish a complete 
sentence.  Dr. Lee accepted me as his student and helped me with all the patience.  He 
has spent much time and effort on teaching me how to be an independent researcher.  
And, he has given me a lot of encouragement along the road.  I still clearly remember that 
I made a very bad presentation and almost lost all my confidence in my third year study.  
Dr. Lee talked to me after the presentation and I heard one of the most beautiful words in 
my life: “Trust me.  You have the ability to get your Ph.D degree.  I never doubt you can 
do that.”  His trust gave me the strength to move on.  Without his support and 
encouragement, I could not persist to today.    
 
Dr Png is my idol (☺).  He is the smartest and most capable man I had ever known.  He 
has taught me not only how to do research but also how to do things perfectly.  I admire 
his ability to make things simple and elegant.  He is also a perfect manager, who knows 
exactly how to help the subordinates to find and use their strong points.  The only bad 
thing to be his student is that it is almost impossible to find a better boss than him, which 
 ii
makes the graduation a pity.  He has so many merits worth me learning from.  One year’s 
study under his guidance is too short and will be cherished in my heart.   
 
I owe thanks to my two best friends in Singapore: Yin Yin Latt and Hu Yu.  Yin Yin Latt 
comes from Myanmar.  It is precious that two girls from different countries with different 
culture could be true sisters.  All the shining days hanging around with them, all the 
laughter and tears, are my best memory.  I know they will guard me and hold my hands 
whenever I need.   
 
I am grateful to my friends here.  They are Sun Jing, Wang Qiu Hong, Li Lin, Zhang 
Cheng, Zhou You You, Guo Rui, Shi Shao Mei, Xia Chen Yi, Gao Jiong, and Guo Xin 
Yu.  Their friendship brings me a lot of joy.   
 
I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to Dr. Julian Wright for his effort to 
maintain the IO workshop, which provides a platform for the researchers in economic and 
IS fields to exchange ideas and discuss research questions together.  I have met a lot of 
excellent researchers there, such as Dr Lu, Jing Feng and Dr Candy Qian Tang.  They 
have given me a lot of encouragement and help for my research. 
 
I thank Dr Laina Ho for her excellent lecture on English writing, where I learnt a lot of 
skills about how to organize and write the Ph.D thesis.  Also, I thank the Department of 
Information Systems of NUS for giving me an opportunity to study in Singapore, as well 
as the financial support.   
 iii
 
I give my deepest thanks to my families, especially to my parents, for their unconditional 
love to me.  My parents know how important education is because their generation did 
not have the chance to attend University.  They make all their efforts to support my 
brothers and me to get high-level education.  It is a very difficult thing in my lovely and 
undeveloped hometown.  In my four years of oversea study, I never encountered any 
other student from the same province, which reminds me what a precious opportunity my 
parents have given me.  I know that they will feel happier than me to see this thesis.   
 
Finally, this thesis is a gift to me.  It represents my four-year effort, happiness, loneliness, 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1 Introduction................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. General Background .......................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Three Studies ...................................................................................................................... 2 
1.3. Contribution........................................................................................................................ 7 
References ................................................................................................................................ 10 
CHAPTER 2 Open Source vs. Proprietary Software: Competition and Compatibility. 15 
2.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 15 
2.2. Literature Review............................................................................................................. 19 
2.3. Basic Model ....................................................................................................................... 21 
2.4. Compatibility and Profits ................................................................................................ 24 
2.5. Quality Differences ........................................................................................................... 28 
2.6. Best Compatibility Strategy............................................................................................. 31 
2.7. Welfare .............................................................................................................................. 35 
2.8. Extension ........................................................................................................................... 38 
2.9. Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 43 
References ................................................................................................................................ 46 
Appendix 2.1. Best Compatibility Strategy ........................................................................... 50 
Appendix 2.2. Calculation of the Welfare ............................................................................. 54 
Appendix 2.3. Proof of Proposition 4..................................................................................... 55 
Appendix 2.4. Proof of Proposition 5..................................................................................... 57 
Appendix 2.5. Proof of Proposition 6..................................................................................... 59 
CHAPTER 3 The Value of IT to Firms in a Developing Country in the Catch-up 
Process: an Empirical Comparison of China and the United States............................. 61 
3.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 61 
3.2. Hypotheses......................................................................................................................... 63 
3.3. Methodology...................................................................................................................... 69 
3.4. Data Collection.................................................................................................................. 71 
3.5. Results................................................................................................................................ 73 
3.6. Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 77 
3.7. Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 80 
References ................................................................................................................................ 82 
CHAPTER 4 Gallery Feature in eBay: Advertising or Signaling ................................. 91 
 v
4.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 91 
4.2. Theory................................................................................................................................ 93 
4.3. Hypotheses......................................................................................................................... 95 
4.4. Data.................................................................................................................................... 96 
4.5. Results................................................................................................................................ 99 
4.6. Discussion and Conclusions ........................................................................................... 107 
References .............................................................................................................................. 110 
Appendix 4.1.  Signaling Effect (Eviews)............................................................................. 113 
CHAPTER 5 Conclusions and Future work ................................................................ 114 
5.1. Competition between Open Source and Proprietary Software .................................. 114 
5.2. IT Investment Value.......................................................................................................116 
5.3. Advertising and Signaling Behavior in eBay................................................................117 
5.4. Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 120 





Many problems in the field of IS can be solved using the theory and methodology of 
economics.  In this thesis, three IS research problems: competition and compatibility 
between open source and proprietary software, IT investment value, advertising and 
signaling in eBay, are investigated from an economic perspective.  
 
The first study focuses on the compatibility choices of a proprietary software producer 
when it competes with an open source software provider.  By applying the Hotelling 
linear city model, I find that the best compatibility strategy for the proprietary software 
producer depends on the market coverage conditions.  When the market is fully covered, 
inward compatibility is the best strategy.  On the other hand, when the market is not fully 
covered, two-way compatibility is the best strategy.  Such results are not affected by 
software quality.  Furthermore, the proprietary software producer does not favor a 
proprietary rival changing to providing open source software, and such a change may 
lower social welfare. 
 
The second study uses the event study methodology of economics to examine whether IT 
investments can pay off.  A comparative study of IT investment value in China and the 
U.S. investigates the differences in IT value between developing and developed countries.  
The results clearly demonstrate that IT investments significantly increase the market 
 vii
value of firms in China while insignificantly in the U.S.  This suggests that IT 
investments have a more significant effect in developing rather than developed countries. 
 
The third study aims to examine whether the optional features in eBay, such as Gallery, 
are advertising tools or quality signals.  Using field data, I find that auctions with Gallery 
feature exhibited more intense competition, and thus had higher final auction price.  
Therefore, the Gallery feature served as an advertising function.  Moreover, for high-
priced products, high quality sellers were more likely to use the Gallery feature compared 
with low quality sellers.  Thus, the Gallery feature served as a quality signal, which 
mitigated the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers.  
 
These three studies demonstrate that economic theory and methodology can be used 
effectively in IS research to address problems related to IT and its application in e-
commerce. 
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CHAPTER 1 INRODUCTION 
 
1.1. General Background  
This thesis applies economic theory and methodology in Information Systems (IS) 
research to study issues associated with information technology (IT) and its application in 
the electronic market.  A basic definition of IS and its relationship with economics is 
given in the following sections to explain why economic theory and methodology can be 
usefully applied in the IS field. 
 
The IS discipline has been defined in different ways.  It has been depicted as “the study 
of the interaction of development and use of IS with organizations” (Cushing 1990), and  
“understanding what is or might be done with computer and software technical systems, 
and the effects they have in the human, organizational and social world” (Avgerou and 
Cornford 1995).  Meanwhile, Davis et al. (1997) presented two areas which IS 
investigates: “(1) acquisition, deployment, and management of information technology 
resources and services (the information systems function), and (2) development and 
evolution of infrastructure and systems for use in organization processes (system 
development)”.  In conclusion, IS discipline investigates: (i) the development and 
application of IT, (ii) the relationship between the IT and social organization.  
 
Economics has been widely accepted as not only one of the reference disciplines of IS 
but also one of the main IS research themes.  Ever since the first International Conference 
of Information Systems (ICIS), economics has been deemed as one of the four reference 
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disciplines of IS together with computer science, management science and organization 
science (Benbasat and Weber 1996).  These four reference disciplines form the major 
foundations of IS (Keen 1980).  Moreover, many researchers classify economic 
application in IS research as one of the main subjects of IS research (Culnan and 
Swanson 1986, Culnan 1987, Swanson and Ramiller 1993, Gosain et al. 1997).  Various 
economic theories, such as game theory and economic models of organizational 
performance, have been applied to explain, predict and solve IS problems.  
 
The reasons for the wide application of economics in IS field are: (i) IS and economics 
have an affinitive relationship, (ii) the economics discipline has solid theory foundation 
and mature methodology, which could be used as effective tools by IS researchers, (iii) 
economics addresses new problems arising with the growth of Internet Commerce.  
 
The three essays in this thesis apply economic theory and methodology to solve three 
research problems in the field of IS, which are competition and compatibility between 
open source software and proprietary software, IT investment value, advertising and 
signaling in eBay.   
 
1.2. Three Studies  
1.2.1. Competition and Compatibility with Open Source Software 
The first essay applies the Hotelling model of horizontal product differentiation to 
investigate competition between open source software and proprietary software.  Open 
source software allows software developers to use shared source codes, identify and 
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correct errors, and redistribute the source codes (OSI 2001, O’Reilly 1999).  Open source 
software has won striking success in recent years and become a threat to proprietary 
software.  Typical examples include Linux vs. Windows and Apache vs. Microsoft IIS. 
 
Facing open source competitors, the developers of the proprietary software intentionally 
chose different compatibility strategies in different cases. 1   For instance, Microsoft 
intentionally made its website incompatible with Firefox, the new open source web 
browser.  However, concerning web server software, Microsoft chose to be inward 
compatible with the open source software.2  For example, in the web server market, 
Microsoft IIS (the proprietary web server) can support both PHP and ASP, the server side 
programming language.  Thus, the programs designed for Apache (the open source web 
server) using PHP language can be run in IIS.  However, since ASP belongs to Microsoft 
and cannot run on Apache, the programs designed for IIS using ASP are not fully usable 
in Apache.  
 
In competition between two products with separate networks, if the network effects are 
strong enough, the respective producers face a dilemma regarding the choice of the 
compatibility.  By choosing to be compatible, its users benefit from the network of the 
rival, but this increases competition.  On the other hand, by choosing to be incompatible, 
                                                 
1 Katz and Shapiro (1998) defined compatible as “when two programs can communicate with one 
another and/or be used with same complementary system components, they are said to be compatible”. 
 
2 For the proprietary software, inward compatibility means that the files or programs designed for the 
open source software product can be used by the proprietary software, but the files or programs 
designed for the proprietary software may not be fully usable in the open source software product. 
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the producer may reduce the intensity of the competition, but then prevents sharing of the 
network from the competitor. 
 
Which compatibility strategy should be chosen?  What is the profit for the proprietary 
software producer under each compatibility strategy?  Will the profit of a proprietary 
software producer increase or fall when its rival changes from providing proprietary to 
open source software?  What are the welfare implications?  Such research questions are 
interesting to both researchers and industry practitioners. 
 
Although the competition and compatibility of two products with different networks have 
been well explored in the economic and IS fields (Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1986, 1994; 
Conner 1995), their results may not be applicable in the case of open source software vs. 
proprietary software.  The reason is that the open source software is free and its profit is 
zero.  Therefore, its competition with proprietary software is obviously different from the 
traditional duopoly competition where two parties pursue maximum profit. 
 
Concerning such differences, I have built a Hotelling linear city model to study 
competition between open source and proprietary software, where only the proprietary 
software producer aims at maximizing the profit and the open source software reacts 
passively.  The best compatibility strategy of the proprietary software producer is 
investigated in two cases - where the market is fully covered and where the market is not 
fully covered.  It is found that the best compatibility strategy under these two cases is 
different.  Furthermore, it is proved that the proprietary software producer does not favor 
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its proprietary rival changes to open source software.  Such change may reduce social 
welfare. 
 
1.2.2. IT Investment Value 
Past decades have witnessed substantial increases in IT investments.  However, despite 
the heavy investments in IT, there has been little evidence of the value produced by IT in 
aggregate output statistics.  Nobel laureate Robert Solow (1987) concluded that “you can 
see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics”.  This widely known 
“productivity paradox” has engendered many amounts of studies including research at the 
country-level (Baily 1986, Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000), industry-level (Schneider 1987, 
Roach 1987, 1991), and firm-level (Harris and Katz 1991).  However, the results of these 
studies were inconclusive.  
 
Given the equivocal results of the productivity approach, researchers have investigated IT 
value from other angles.  One of these angles is to examine how IT improves firm 
performance.  In particular, IT value could be proved as the increase of the firms’ market 
value.  The innovative research in this theme is by Dos Santos et al. (1993) and Im et al. 
(2001).  They used the event study methodology to provide evidence that IT investments 
can increase the market value of firms.  Both of them, however, got negative results.  
 
Most previous studies of IT value were limited to U.S. data.  However, with the rise of 
Asia in recent years, the value of IT in Asia has attracted much attention (Amsden 2001, 
Enos et al. 1997, Hobday 1995, Kim 1997, Lall 2000, Mathews and Cho 2000). 
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Some scholars believe that IT plays an important role in the rise of Asian firms.  In 
contrast, other researchers are skeptical about the efficiency of IT adoption and diffusion 
in developing countries.  Compared with developed countries, developing countries are 
believed to have inadequate IT infrastructures, ineffective policy and lack of 
communication (Sauvant 1984, Dasgupta et al. 1999, Dewan and Kraemer 2000).  All 
these obstacles could slow down IT adoption in developing countries.  As a result, IT 
investment in the firms in developing countries may not be as efficient as that in 
developed countries.  
 
Because of these contradictive expectations, I conducted a comparative study of IT 
investment value to firms in developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries, to 
provide a better understanding of IT value in different contexts.  This study tries to 
answer the following questions: (1) Whether IT can increase the firms’ value in 
developing countries and developed countries respectively;  (2) Whether IT investment in 
firms in developing countries is as efficient as that in developed countries;  (3) How does 
IT value vary with respect to various features such as the firm size and firm type in 
different countries? 
 
1.2.3. Advertising and Signaling in eBay 
The third essay aims to study advertising and signaling effects in online auction markets.  
Major online auction markets, such as eBay and Yahoo auction, provide optional features, 
such as Gallery (inserting a large picture of the items being sold), for sellers to promote 
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their items.  The research question arises: What is the function of these optional features?  
One possibility is that these features are advertising which attracts buyers’ attention and 
increases sellers’ profit.  Another possibility is that these features could be quality signals, 
which mitigate the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers.  
 
To distinguish between the advertising and the signaling effects, I collected field data 
from eBay to test the sales-response function and sellers’ selection of the Gallery feature.  
It was found that auctions with the Gallery feature exhibit more intense competition and 
end with a higher price.  Such results indicate that the Gallery feature serves as an 
advertising tool.  Moreover, for high-priced products, high quality sellers are more likely 
to choose the Gallery feature than low quality sellers.  Hence, for high-priced products, 
Gallery is a quality signal, which helps sellers credibly communicate the private 
information and establish trust with buyers.  
 
This study has two empirical implications: firstly, these optional features are proved to be 
profitable advertising tools.  Hence, sellers can use them to earn price premia.  Secondly, 
for high-priced products, these optional features may help buyers to get more information 
about sellers’ quality and reduce the risk in online transactions.   
 
1.3. Contribution 
More and more proprietary software producers must compete with open source software.  
However, there have been few studies of the compatibility choices of proprietary 
software producers.  The first essay in this thesis addresses this issue and provides 
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theoretical support for the managers of the proprietary software regarding the 
compatibility strategies.  Furthermore, the results shed light on the impact of the open 
source software on the proprietary software producer and on society.  Moreover, the 
welfare analysis suggests to governments that the move to open source software may 
lower social welfare.  Thus, the governments should be careful to promote the open 
source movement. 
 
How to measure the value of IT has been discussed for decades in the field of IS.  Most 
research in this field was limited to U.S. data.  Moreover, previous studies could not find 
positive evidence that IT investments can increase the market value of the firms.  The 
second essay in this thesis provides a comparative study of IT investment value in China 
with that in the U.S.  It showed that IT investments have a positive impact on the firms in 
China, but not in the U.S.  Thus, IT could be a bigger opportunity for the firms in 
developing countries compared with those in developed countries.  This essay provides 
empirical evidence for the IT value in developing counties, and hence enriches the 
limited research in this stream.   
 
Signaling has a solid theoretical foundation, but limited empirical support.  In the third 
essay in this thesis, I conduct an empirical test, which examines whether the optional 
features used in eBay are quality signals or advertising tools.  Such a test provides 
empirical support for the signaling theory.  Furthermore, the Gallery feature is proved to 
serve advertising and signaling functions, which can smooth transactions and establish 
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trust between transaction parties.  E-commerce providers can apply these findings in their 
service design.   
 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the essay “Open Source vs. 
Proprietary Software: Competition and Compatibility”; Chapter 3 presents “The Value of 
IT to Firms in a Developing Country in the Catch-up Process: an Empirical Comparison 
of China and the Untied States”; while Chapter 4 presents the essay “Gallery Feature in 
eBay: Advertising or Signaling”.  In the last chapter, I briefly summarize the results of 
these three essays and propose a few possible directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 OPEN SOURCE VS. PROPRIETARY 
SOFTWARE: COMPETITION AND COMPATIBILITY 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen the striking success of open source software, which allows 
software developers to use shared source codes, identify and correct errors, and 
redistribute the source codes (OSI 2001, O’Reilly 1999).  One of the most famous and 
successful open source software projects is Linux, which commands a third market share 
within the server operating system market, and whose share is expected to grow to 41 
percent by 2005 (International Data Corporation IDC 2002).  Another well-known 
example is Apache, which supports 67 percent of web sites on the Internet (Netcraft Web 
Server Survey 2004).  Other successful open source software products have had 
significant market shares in their product categories.  For instance, Sendmail, an open 
source email transfer program, carries an estimated 80% of the entire world’s e-mail 
traffic (Weber 2004). 
 
Open source software threatens proprietary software producers.3  Amazon reported that 
adopting open source software has reduced 25 percent of its technology expenses.  The 
European city Munich is switching from Windows to Linux, and from Internet Explorer 
(IE) to Mozilla browser (CNet News 2004a).  
 
                                                 
3 I use the term ‘proprietary software’ as non-free software (Working Group on Libre Software 2000). 
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To survive and win the maximum profit in the battle with the open source software, 
proprietary software producers may adopt one of four different compatibility strategies: 
incompatibility; two-way compatibility; inward compatibility; and outward 
compatibility. 4   These four compatibility strategies can be understood through the 
following examples: 
 
z Windows, a proprietary software product, is incompatible with Linux, an open 
source software product.  
 
z In the case of web browsers, Internet Explorer (IE), a proprietary software product, is 
two-way compatible with Mozilla, an open source product.  Files created for IE users 
can be used without any difficulty by Mozilla users and vice versa.   
 
z In the web server market, Microsoft IIS (a proprietary web server) is inward 
compatible: it can support both PHP and ASP, server side programming languages.  
Thus, the programs designed for Apache (an open source web server) using PHP 
language can be executed in IIS.  However, since ASP belongs to Microsoft and 
cannot execute on Apache, the programs designed for IIS using ASP are not usable 
in Apache.  
 
z Finally, outward compatibility means that the files or programs designed for the 
proprietary software can be used by the open source software while files or programs 
                                                 
4 Katz and Shapiro (1998) defined compatibility as follows: “When two programs can communicate 
with one another and/or be used with the same complementary system components, they are said to be 
compatible”. 
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designed for the open source software are not usable by the proprietary software.  
Realistically, outward compatibility is seldom observed.  
 
These different compatibility strategies present a series of research questions: why would 
a proprietary software producer choose different strategies of compatibility when facing 
competition from open source software?  How would the choices of compatibility affect 
the profitability of a proprietary software producer?  Furthermore, what are the welfare 
implications?  
 
Another series of questions relate to the impact of open source software.  If the open 
source software pursues maximum market share rather than reacts passively, should the 
proprietary software producer change the compatibility strategy?  How would the 
proprietary producer’s profit, price and market share be affected if its rival changes from 
providing proprietary to open source software?  Does such a switch benefit society or not?  
 
This essay addresses these research questions using the Hotelling model of competition 
between the open source and proprietary software.  In contrast with the conventional 
Hotelling model, only one party – the proprietary software producer – aims at 
maximizing profit, and the open source software is passive. 
 
The different compatibility choices of the proprietary software result in different network 
externalities for the open source and proprietary software.  Thus, the price and profit of 
the proprietary software vary correspondently.  I compare the maximum profit of the 
 18
proprietary software under different compatibility strategies, and propose the best 
compatibility strategy for the propriety software producer.5 
 
The main findings in this part are: when the market is fully covered, i.e., when all the 
consumers purchase one of the two products, inward compatibility is the best strategy.  
However, when the market is partly covered, two-way compatibility is the best strategy.  
Furthermore, the welfare analysis provides some implications on how the welfare would 
be affected by different parameters, such as the network externality intensity and 
software quality.  
 
Next, I relax the conditions of the basic model to investigate competition between open 
source and proprietary software under different scenarios.  Firstly, I suppose that the open 
source software aims at maximizing the market share rather than reacts passively.  In 
such a case, two-way compatibility is a Nash Equilibrium in both fully covered market 
and partly covered market. 
 
Secondly, I examine the impact of open source software on proprietary software and on 
society.  It is found that a proprietary software producer does not favor its proprietary 
rival changing to open source software because such change will lower its market share, 
price and profit.  Furthermore, contrary to the general belief that the change from 
proprietary software to open source software will benefit society, I find that under certain 
conditions, such a change will decrease social welfare. 
                                                 
5 In the following context, by default, the best compatibility strategy means the best compatibility 
strategy for a proprietary software producer. 
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The rest of this essay is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 reviews the literature on open 
source software.  Section 2.3 introduces the basic Hotelling model of asymmetric 
competition between open source and proprietary software.  In sections 2.4, I compare 
the market results under different compatibility choices when the base-level qualities of 
the open source and proprietary software are the same.  Section 2.5 presents market 
results when open and proprietary software have different base-level qualities.  Section 
2.6 proposes the best compatibility strategy under different market coverage conditions.  
Section 2.7 investigates the implication for welfare.  Section 2.8 extends the basic model 
to investigate competition between open source and proprietary software under different 
scenarios.  Section 2.9 discusses the results and suggests possible directions for future 
work. 
 
2.2. Literature Review  
The most widely investigated research question in past literature on open source software 
is to identify the economic and non-economic motivations for individual developers to 
contribute to open source software (Lerner and Tirole 2002, Lakhani and Wolf 2003, 
Hann et al. 2002).  Currently, researchers classify the possible reasons into intrinsic 
motivation, such as intellectual stimulation (Lakhani and Wolf 2003), and extrinsic 
motivation, including career concerns (Lerner and Tirole 2002) and peer recognition 
(Raymond 1999, Vostroknutov 2002).  
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Another theme of prior research focuses on the quality of open source software and 
competition between open source and proprietary software.  An important conclusion is 
that open source software is not necessarily inferior in quality to proprietary software 
(Mishra et al. 2002, Dalle and Jullien 2002, Kuan 2001, Johnson 2001, and Bessen 2002).  
This conclusion is derived from models of different aspects: Mishra et al. (2002) 
compared the quality of software under open source and closed environments; Kuan 
(2001) demonstrated that open source software has a higher rate of quality improvement 
than proprietary software; Johnson (2001) modeled open source software as the private 
provision of public goods; Dalle and Jullien (2002) presented organizational structure and 
compatibility as key factors to the quality of open source software. 
 
Within the research theme outlined above, one strand has been to consider competition 
between open source and proprietary software.  Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat 
(2003) modeled the competition between Windows and Linux as a dynamic “mixed 
duopoly”, where a not-for-profit competitor interacts with a for-profit competitor.  What 
the study named mixed duopoly differs from the well-investigated mixed oligopoly 
competition, where one party pursues profit maximization while the other (most probably 
a public producer) aims at welfare maximization (Cremer et al. 1989, 1991, DeFraja and 
Delbono 1989, Fershtman 1990, Fjell and Pal 1996, White 1996).  Casadesus-Masanell 
and Ghemawat (2003) showed that, as long as Windows’ pricing decision is not myopic, 
the result of the competition would be either the coexistence of the two products or Linux 
being driven out of the market.  
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This essay takes a similar approach but differs from Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat 
(2003) in two aspects.  The main difference is in the research questions.  This work 
focuses on strategic choices for compatibility – a topic seldom investigated in previous 
studies on open source software.  I seek to find the best compatibility strategy rather than 
predict the results of competition.  Secondly, I model the consumers’ heterogeneous 
preferences for products.  Software users differ in their technology sophistication.  Open 
source software is often appealing to sophisticated users while proprietary software is 
usually more user-friendly and more likely to be adopted by less sophisticated users.  
Furthermore, software users differ in their past experiences.  Different users have 
different extent of ‘lock-in’ to certain kind of software.  Thus, the switching cost and 
adopting cost are heterogeneous among the users.  Moreover, software users’ preferences 
are affected by their different environments.  For instance, most conferences in computer 
science department provide LeTax (open source file compiler software) file style for 
authors, which greatly encourages the adopting of LeTax in the academic area.  
Concerning these factors, I believe that consumers have different tastes for the products.  
The consumers who have lower taste for the open source software would rather choose 
the proprietary software even though the open source software is free of charge.  The 
difference in the consumers’ taste allows rich intuitive interpretations for real-world 
software competition. 
 
2.3. Basic Model   
Consider a software market where two software products are located at the ends of a unit 
line, i.e., the open source software (O) is located at x=0 and the proprietary software (P) 
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is located at x=1 (see Figure 2.1).  Consumers are uniformly distributed along the unit 
interval and they have unit demand for the software.  Consumers differ in their taste for 
the products.  Specifically, for a consumer located at [ , ]x 0 1∈ , she incurs utility cost tx if 
she uses the open source software because of the difference between her ideal preference 
and the product specifications.  Similarly, she incurs utility cost t(1-x) if she chooses the 
proprietary software, where t measures the consumers’ taste difference.  I assume that the 
marginal costs of both the open source and proprietary software products are zero.  
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), the network externalities are a linear function of the 
number of users who adopt the same or compatible software products.  
 
    Figure 2.1:  Basic Hotelling Model 
In the basic model, I assume that the two products have the same inherent quality s and 
are incompatible.  Furthermore, I assume that the market is fully covered, i.e., all the 
consumers choose to use one of the two software products.  This is always true when the 
benefit of the product is sufficiently large.  If a consumer located at x adopts the open 
source software, her net utility oU  would be o o oU s kq tx qγ= + − + , where oq  is the 
number of open source users and k  measures the degree of contribution of each 
consumer to the quality of the open source software.  The parameter γ  is to the network 
externality that a software user receives from other users of same or compatible software.  
I assume that the open source software product is freely available, and there is no price 
component in the net utility.  Similarly, if the consumer located at x adopts the 
x 1-x
  xc O P 
 23
proprietary software, her net utility pU  is ( )p pU s t 1 x q pγ= − − + − , where pq  denotes 
the number of proprietary software users and p is the price of the proprietary software. 
 
Suppose the consumer at [ , ]cx 0 1∈  is indifferent between the open source and 
proprietary software products, then from po UU = , it can be derived that: 
  , , .c o p
p t p t p tx q q 1
2t 2 k 2t 2 k 2t 2 k
γ γ γ
γ γ γ
+ − + − + −=  =  = −− − − − − −      
The profit for the proprietary software producer is: 
( ) ( ) [ ]p c
p tp pq p 1 x p 1
2t 2 k
γπ γ
+ −= = − = − − − .             
By solving the profit maximization problem with respect to p, it can be derived: 
* t kp
2
γ− −= ,     
( )*
[ ( ) ]
2t k
4 2 t k
γπ γ
− −= − − , 
where *p  and *π  denote the equilibrium price and profit respectively. 
Using *pM  to represent the market share of the proprietary software under the equilibrium 
price and *oM  to denote that of the open source software, we have:                 
*
[ ( ) ]p
t kM
2 2 t k
γ
γ







γ .    
The proprietary software producer will choose positive market share and profit.  We have: 
t k 0
2t 2 k 0
γ
γ
− − >        
− − >    
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The base-level qualities of proprietary and open source software are identical.  However, 
the quality of the open source software increases with the number of users, and the price 
of open source software is zero.  Hence, in equilibrium, the open source software has a 
bigger market share than the proprietary software. 
 
2.4. Compatibility and Profits 
In the basic model, I assumed that the open source and proprietary software were 
incompatible.  However, the proprietary software producer may also choose for its 
product to be compatible to some degree with the open source software.  Which is the 
best strategy?  How does this compatibility decision change the profitability of 
proprietary software?  To answer these questions, I extend the basic model to consider 
different degrees of compatibility.  In common with the Hotelling model, the analysis 
depends on whether the market is fully covered. 
 
2.4.1. Fully Covered Market  
I firstly present how the utility functions of the open source and proprietary software 
consumers change according to different compatibility strategies when the market is fully 
covered.  Next, I summarize the net utilities of the open source and proprietary software 
consumers and the equilibrium outcomes under different compatibility strategies in Table 
2.1. 
• Two-way compatibility 
Two-way compatibility is the case where the open source and proprietary software are 
compatible with each other.  In this case, users of the two software products share the 
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same network externality. 6   Since the market is fully covered, the total number of 
software users is 1.  Thus, the network externality is γγ =+ )( po qq . 
• Inward compatibility 
I define inward compatibility as the case where the proprietary software is compatible 
with the open source software, but the open source software is incompatible with the 
proprietary software.  In this case, the network externality for users of the proprietary 
software is ( )o pq qγ γ+ = , and the network externality for users of the open source 
software is oqγ . 
• Outward compatibility 
Outward compatibility is defined as the case where the proprietary software is 
incompatible with the open source software, but the open source software is compatible 
with the proprietary software.  In this case, the network externality for users of the 
proprietary software is pqγ , and the network externality for users of the open source 
software is ( )o pq qγ γ+ = .  
 
Table 2.1 reports the net utilities of the open source and proprietary software consumers 
and the equilibrium outcomes under different compatibility strategies. 7 
                                                 
6 Following the previous literature (Farrell and Saloner 1992), I suppose the network externality 
intensity γ  is the same for all the networks. 
 
7 In this and following tables, oU and pU indicate the net utilities of open source and proprietary 
software consumers respectively; *p and *π are the equilibrium price and profit of the proprietary 
software; *oM  and 
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Table 2.1: Fully Covered Market: Equilibrium Outcomes  
 
2.4.2. Partly Covered Market 
Suppose the market is partly covered.  Some consumers use neither the open source 
software nor the proprietary software.  This may happen when the benefit provided by the 
software is small compared with users’ cost.  The basic model is thus changed as follows: 
 
        Figure 2.2:  Competition: Partly Covered Market 
 
The consumers at [ , ]ox 0 x∈  would choose the open source software, where xo is the 
location of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between using and not using the 
open source software.  On the other hand, the consumers at [ , ]px 1 x 1∈ −  would choose 
P xo 
xo 
  xp O 
0 11-xp 
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the proprietary software, where px−1  is the location of the marginal consumer who is 
indifferent between buying and not buying the proprietary software.  The third group of 
consumers at [ , ]o px x 1 x∈ −  will choose neither the open source software nor the 
proprietary software. 
 
The net utilities of the open source and proprietary software consumers under different 
compatibility strategies are reported in Table 2.2.  By setting oU 0=  and pU 0= , we can 
get the equilibrium outcomes, which are also summarized in Table 2.2. 
 
 Two-way Compatibility  Inward Compatibility 
Outward 
Compatibility   Incompatibility 
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Table 2.2: Partly Covered Market: Equilibrium Outcomes  
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2.5. Quality Differences  
In section 2.4, the base-level qualities of the open source software and proprietary 
software are assumed to be equal.  Since the open source software will increase in quality 
corresponding to the number of users, the market share of the open source software is 
higher than that of the proprietary software.  In some situations, however, this condition 
may not be true.  In this section, I extend the model and give the equilibrium outcomes 
when the base-level quality of the proprietary software is different from that of the open 
source software.  
 
Suppose the open source software and the proprietary software products have different 
qualities, denoted by os  and ps  respectively.  With similar procedures in section 2.4, I 
can get the net utilities of open source and proprietary software consumers and the 
equilibrium outcomes under different market coverage conditions, which are reported in 
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. 
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Partly Covered Market 
 
 Two-way Compatibility  Inward Compatibility Outward Compatibility 
Incompatibili
ty  











− +   
















2 2 t k
γ
γ+ − −  ( )
p o
s s
2 2 t k
γ







*π  [ ( )]




s s t k
4 t t k t k
γ γ
γ γ γ γ
+ − −




p p p o
2
s t s s k s




− − − ( )
2
ps
4 t γ−  ( )
2
ps
4 t γ−  
*
oM  
[( )( ) ]( )








2 t t k t k
ss
t k 2 t t k
γ
γ γ γ γ
γ
γ γ γ γ
− − − − − −
− − − − − −+ +
 
os















   +
 
os
t k γ− −  
*
pM  ( )
[( )( ) ]
o p
2
s s t k




− − − −  
( )
( )( )
p os t k s




− − −  ( )
ps
2 t γ−  ( )
ps
2 t γ−  
Table 2.4: Quality Differences: Partly Covered Market 
 31
 
2.6. Best Compatibility Strategy  
I have examined the best compatibility strategy under different market coverage 
conditions by comparing the equilibrium outcomes in section 2.4 and section 2.5, and 
derived the following results:  
Proposition 1  A proprietary software producer should never choose 
incompatibility or outward compatibility. 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 2.1. 
 
Under all conditions, the proprietary producer should not choose incompatibility or 
outward compatibility.  Intuitively, to the proprietary software producer, inward 
compatibility can bring more profit than incompatibility by allowing proprietary software 
users to share the network benefits from open source users.  Furthermore, incompatibility 
is always better than outward compatibility, in that it prevents open source software users 
from sharing the network benefits of proprietary software users.  Therefore, 
incompatibility and outward compatibility would never be the best strategy.  Consistent 
with these results, in reality, outward compatibility can hardly be observed.  
Incompatibility is also rare. 
 
Proposition 2  When the market is partly covered, a proprietary software producer 
earns the highest profit from two-way compatibility, followed by inward compatibility, 
and last, incompatibility or outward compatibility.  
<proof> Please see the Appendix 2.1. 
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When the market is partly covered, one additional open source software user does not 
decrease the number of proprietary software users.  In this case, an increase in open 
source software users can benefit proprietary software users through the network 
externality, without decreasing the market share of the proprietary software.  Therefore, 
two-way compatibility is a win-win strategy: it increases the proprietary producers’ profit 
while enhancing the user base of the open source software, which generates positive 
externalities for the users of the proprietary software. 
 
Realistically, most software markets are not fully covered.  Thus, two-way compatibility 
is common.  Typical examples include IE vs. Mozilla and Microsoft Outlook vs. Mozilla 
Thunderbird.  Furthermore, some proprietary software producers are improving the 
compatibility with open source software.  For instance, Microsoft has committed in 
perpetuity to offering a royalty-free license of Office-related XML document formats, 
which encourages other open source software, such as Open Office, to create “filters” to 
read the files created in Microsoft Office (CNet News, 2004 b).        
 
Proposition 3.1  When the market is fully covered, the proprietary software 
producer earns the highest profit from inward compatibility, and the lowest from outward 
compatibility.  However, the profitability of two-way compatibility and incompatibility 
depends on the quality difference between the open source software and the proprietary 
software. 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 2.1. 
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Proposition 3.2  When the market is fully covered and the quality difference 
between proprietary software and open source software is sufficiently small that 
( )( )
p o
k 2t k 2t k 2
s s
2
γ+ − − −− < , the proprietary software producer earns the highest 
profit from inward compatibility, followed by two-way compatibility, incompatibility, 
and last, outward compatibility.  
<proof> Please see the Appendix 2.1. 
 
Proposition 3.3  When the market is fully covered and the quality difference 
between proprietary software and open source software is sufficiently large that 
( )( )
p o
k 2t k 2t k 2
s s
2
γ+ − − −− > ,  the proprietary software producer earns the highest 
profit from inward compatibility, followed by incompatibility, two-way compatibility, 
and last, outward compatibility. 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 2.1. 
 
A covered market indicates that the two products are in severe competition, i.e., one 
product can gain a user only if the other product loses one user.  Thus, the proprietary 
software producer should adopt a strategy which promotes the increase of its users while 
restraining the growth of open source software.  Inward compatibility allows proprietary 
software users to share the network externality of open source users, while preventing 
open source software users from sharing the network externality of the proprietary 
software.  Therefore, it becomes the best compatibility strategy.        
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In a covered market, the profit ranking of the incompatibility and two-way compatibility 
varies according to the quality difference between the open source and proprietary 
software.  On the one hand, the price of the proprietary software with two-way 
compatibility is higher than that with incompatibility (see Table 2.3).  On the other hand, 
the market share of the proprietary software with two-way compatibility may be lower 
than that with incompatibility.  This could happen when the proprietary software has 
sufficiently higher quality and becomes the dominating software in the market.  
Combining the price and market share factors together, it can be concluded that once the 
quality of the proprietary software is high enough and the market share factor dominates 
the price factor, the proprietary software producer will choose incompatibility rather than 
two-way compatibility. 
 
Such results provide theoretical explanations for the actual behavior of proprietary 
software producers.  For instance, the Windows Update website denies access by Firefox, 
the new open source browser.  This shows that Microsoft refuses to be compatible with 
Firefox, and thus restrains its growth. 
 
The change of the profit ranking of incompatibility and two-way compatibility is 
consistent with the argument of Katz and Shapiro (1985).  They develop a static model of 
oligopoly and conclude that the firms with large existing network externalities will tend 
to be against compatibility.  In contrast, firms with small existing network externalities 
will tend to favor product compatibility.  In the case of proprietary vs. open source 
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software, when the proprietary software has sufficiently high quality, its existing network 
externalities are large.  Hence, the proprietary software producer favors incompatibility 
over two-way compatibility.  In contrast, when the quality of the proprietary software is 
sufficiently small, proprietary software has small existing network externalities.  
Therefore, two-way compatibility is more profitable than incompatibility. 
 
Moreover, I extend the conclusion of Katz and Shapiro (1985) by adding the inward and 
outward compatibility, which they did not discuss.  I show tdhat in both fully covered and 
partly covered markets, inward compatibility is always superior to incompatibility.  
Hence, their conclusion that incompatibility can be the best strategy may not hold if 
inward compatibility can be realized.  
 
2.7. Welfare  
In this section, I calculate the social welfare and investigate how the parametersγ , s, k 
and t affect the social welfare.  Social welfare in this model is the sum of sellers’ profit 
and consumers’ surplus.  Since the open source software is freely distributed, I deem that 
sellers’ profit from the open source software is zero. For tractability, I assume that the 
base-level qualities of proprietary and open source software are equal. 
 
I investigate the case where the market is fully covered.  The proprietary software 
producer is assumed to adopt the best strategy: inward compatibility.  The welfare is 
denoted as W and presented as follows: 
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For the detailed calculations, please refer to Appendix 2.2. 
 
I next investigate how the changes in the parameters s, γ, k and t affect the welfare.  The 
results of the comparative statics are summarized in Table 2.5.8  
Table 2.5: Social Welfare  
 
Firstly, it is intuitive that the increase in quality will raise the social welfare.  Secondly, 
with the increase of the network externality intensity γ , the consumer surplus of both the 
open source users and the proprietary software users will increase.  Thus, the social 
welfare will increase.  Thirdly, higher k increases the quality of the open source software.  
Hence, consumer surplus increases.  However, the increase in k reduces sellers’ profit.  
From the comparative statics, it can be seen that the increase in consumer surplus 
dominates the decrease in sellers’ profit, and welfare increases with the increase in k.  
 
Moreover, the first order derivative of W with respect to t is:  
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
3 2
W k k t 3t 2 k 3t 2 k 2 t k t k 1
t 2 2t k 4 2t k 2 2t k 2
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
∂ − + − − − − − − − − −  = − − +∂ − − − − − − . 
                                                 
8 I also calculated welfare with two-way compatibility when the market is fully covered.  The results 
of comparative statics are the same. 
 Increase in s Increase in γ Increase in k 
Welfare + + + 
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It is complicated to determine the sign of this equation analytically.  Thus, I plot a figure 
to show how welfare changes according to t.  In Figure 2.3, I fix s 0=  and .0 5γ = , and 
show that with the increase of taste difference t, the social welfare will decrease.9  On the 
one hand, higher t binds consumers to the proprietary software and increases the 
monopoly power of the proprietary software.  Thus, the sellers’ profits will increase.  On 
the other hand, higher t lowers the consumer surplus.  From Figure 2.3, one can see that 
the latter impact dominates the former one and social welfare decreases with the increase 






Figure 2.3: Welfare when .0 5γ = and s 0=  
 
                                                 
9 I have tried other values of s and γ .  The results are quite similar. 
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2.8. Extension 
2.8.1. Open Source Software Aiming at Increasing the Market Share  
In previous chapters, I have assumed that the proprietary software producer seeks profit 
maximization while open source software reacts passively.  For certain open source 
software, however, maximizing market share could be the aim.  For instance, Sun uses 
StarOffice to battle with Microsoft Office and has won over 10 percent total market share 
(PC World News 2002).  
 
In the above case, the competition changes to an asymmetric duopoly, where the 
proprietary software pursues the profit maximization and the open source software aims 
at maximizing market share.  What would the best compatibility strategy be?  I use a one-
period game model to analyze this situation and derive the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4  When open source software aims at maximizing market share and 
proprietary pursues maximum profit, the competition between open source and 
proprietary software results in two-way compatibility in both fully covered and partly 
covered markets. 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 2.3. 
 
The different aims of the open source software will affect the compatibility choices of the 
proprietary software.  As mentioned previously, when the market is partly covered, two-
way compatibility is a win-win strategy for both open and proprietary software, and 
therefore, a Nash Equilibrium.  Moreover, when the market is fully covered and both 
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parties have their maximization aims, if either party chooses incompatibility, the other 
will choose compatibility to benefit from network externality.  Therefore, two-way 
compatibility will be a Nash Equilibrium.       
2.8.2. ‘Proprietary vs. Open’ and ‘Proprietary vs. Proprietary’ 
Today, opening the source code has become a trend that more and more proprietary 
software products are adopting.  For instance, IBM has offered the source code of 
Cloudscape, a Java-based relational database software worth $85 million, to the Apache 
Software Foundation.  The goal is to spur Java application development (IDG News 
Service 2004).  Microsoft .Net, the rival of Java, will be seriously affected by such move 
of IBM.  Similarly, Sun opened the source code of Solaris to better compete with 
Microsoft Windows OS (Computer Weekly News 2005).  
 
Lerner and Tirole (2002) analyze the economic motivation of a proprietary software 
vendor opening its source code.  The software vendor expects that the opening of the 
source code will boost its profit on a proprietary complementary segment.  If the increase 
in profit in the proprietary complementary segment is large enough to offset the loss from 
opening source code, it is profitable for software vendor to release its source code.   
 
How does the competition with open source software change the behavior of the 
proprietary software producer compared with the case where the rival is another 
proprietary producer?  Will the change to open source software increase social welfare?  I 
investigate these questions by comparing market outcomes of the basic model with those 
of the “proprietary vs. proprietary” case.  
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• Comparison of price, market share and profit 
Let us consider a covered duopoly market where two proprietary software producers 
compete.  I consider two extreme cases: incompatibility and two-way compatibility.  It is 
assumed that the compatibility strategies chosen by two software producers are 
symmetric.  Here, I do not go through the details of the procedures because the results of 
two symmetric producers under Hotelling model are well known.  I simply provide the 
following propositions. 
 
Proposition 5  When the competitor is an open source software product, the 
proprietary software developer faces lower price, lower market share, and lower profit 
compared with the case when the rival is another proprietary software developer.  
<proof> Please see the Appendix 2.4. 
 
As Proposition 5 indicates, it is better for a proprietary software product to compete with 
another proprietary software product than contend with open source software.  When its 
rival changes from providing proprietary to open source software, the proprietary 
software producer is worse off in every aspect.  Such results explain why Microsoft 
executives have publicly decried that the open-source movement is, at minimum, bad for 
competition, and, at worst, a "cancer" to everything it touches (CNet News 2001).  
Furthermore, my results are consistent with Microsoft’s sensitivity to Netscape or Sun 
opening up some parts of their products.  
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• Comparison of the social welfare 
Proposition 6  When two proprietary software products are compatible and the 
market is fully covered, the change of one proprietary software to open source software 
will increase social welfare if and only if ( )3 2t k 3t k< − . 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 2.5. 
 
Such results are counterintuitive.  Generally, it is believed that the open source software 
will benefit social welfare by providing free high quality software. However, the results 
indicate that this is not always the case.  The change of the proprietary software to open 
source software may lower social welfare under the condition that the consumers taste 
difference t is sufficiently high.  
 
To get a better understanding of the results, I draw Figure 2.4 and show how the value of 
( )
3 3 2 2
op pp 2
t k 9kt 6tkW W
4 2t k
− + + −− = − changes in term of t and k, where ppW  represents the 
social welfare with competition between two compatible proprietary software products 
and opW  indicates the social welfare when one of the proprietary software changes to 






Figure 2.4: Picture of op ppW W−   
 
From Figure 2.4, it can be seen that when k is small and t is large, the welfare of 
“proprietary vs. open” is smaller than that of “proprietary vs. proprietary”, which means 
that social welfare is worse off when one of the proprietary software products changes to 
open source software.  In contrast, when k is large and t is small, the change of the 
proprietary software to open source software benefits the social welfare.  
 
The reason is that the change to open source software increases the software quality, 
which has two opposite impacts on the social welfare.  On the one hand, higher quality 
increases the consumer surplus and raises the social welfare.  On the other hand, the 
higher quality of the open source software drives the marginal consumers to switch from 
proprietary software to open source software.  Since open source software covers more 
than half of the whole market share (see section 2.3), these marginal consumers move 
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from the nearer software to the further one, and the consumer surplus decreases.  In 
Figure 2.4, one can see that when t is large and k is small, the reduction in consumer 
surplus is the dominating factor and the social welfare will be lower. 
 
Such results suggest that governments should not encourage the open source movement 
unconditionally.  For instance, following Munich’s decision to switch from Microsoft 
software to open source software, Paris postponed a similar move in light of the 
incompatible problem and high migration cost (ZDNet news, 2004).  
 
2.9. Conclusions  
I used the Hotelling model to investigate competition between open source and 
proprietary software.  Firstly, I focused on the compatibility choices of the proprietary 
software.  It was shown that the best compatibility strategy depends on the market 
coverage degree. When the market is fully covered, inward compatibility is the best 
strategy.  When the market is partly covered, however, two-way compatibility is the best 
strategy.  Moreover, the welfare analysis implied that the increase of t (the taste 
difference of consumers) may decrease the social welfare, although it can increase the 
profit of the proprietary software producer. 
 
Next, I relaxed the conditions in the basic model and investigated competition between 
open source and proprietary software in different scenarios. Firstly, I assumed that the 
open source software provider begins to maximize market share rather than react 
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passively.  The results showed that two-way compatibility is the best choice for both the 
proprietary and the open source software. 
 
Secondly, I investigated the impact of the open source software from two aspects.  From 
the aspect of a proprietary software producer, I found that it does not favor its proprietary 
rival changing to open source software.  When the rival changes from providing 
proprietary to open source software, both the market share and the profit of the 
proprietary software producer will decease.  From the aspect of social welfare, I found 
that when the rival of a proprietary software product changes from providing proprietary 
to open source software, social welfare may be lower if the consumers’ taste difference is 
sufficiently high.  
 
It is important to consider how the model’s simplifying assumptions may affect the 
conclusions.  Firstly, I have assumed that the compatibility strategies are chosen by the 
proprietary software producer.  However, in the software market, the compatibility choice 
is decided not only by software producers but also by the software architecture.  
Sometimes, compatibility may not be feasible because the architecture of the two 
software products is quite different, while other times, it may be difficult to technically 
implement the inward compatibility.  The results may not be applicable in such cases.  
 
Secondly, I have assumed there is no installed user-base for both open source and 
proprietary software.  However, realistically, the open source software and the 
proprietary software may not enter the market simultaneously.  The software which 
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enters earlier will grab the consumers and have large existing network externalities.  
Therefore, the best compatibility strategy may change.  Such limitation of the analysis 
suggests directions for future study.  In the further work, it would be interesting to 
consider how the installed user-base affects the compatibility choices of the proprietary 
software. 
 
Finally, for tractability, I have assumed consumers’ taste difference is larger than the 
network externality intensity.  If this assumption is violated, the equilibrium results are 
unstable.  The switch of the marginal consumer from one software to the other makes 
every consumer follows the switch.  Such a tipping market needs further investigation.     
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Appendix 2.1. Best Compatibility Strategy  
2A.1.1. Fully Covered Market  
In the proof procedures, strategy I denotes two-way compatibility.  Also, strategy II 
denotes inward compatibility.  Strategy III and Strategy IV means the outward and 
incompatibility respectively.  
• Equal base-level qualities  
Table 2.1 reports the equilibrium outcomes of the fully covered market when open source 
and proprietary software have equal base-level qualities.  From Table 2.1, we have: 
*( ) *( ) *( ) *( )p III p IV p I p II= < = ,                  (A-1) 
* * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p p p pM III M IV M I M II< < < .                 (A-2) 
By (A-1) and (A-2), we have *( ) *( ) *( ) *( )III IV I IIπ π π π< < < . 
• Different base-level qualities 
When the market is fully covered and the base-level qualities of the open source and 
proprietary software are different, from the Table 2.3, we have: 
*( ) *( ) *( ) *( )p III p IV p I p II= < = , 
* *( ) ( )p pM III M IV< , * *( ) ( )p pM I M II< , 
* *( ) ( )p pIII IVπ π< , * *( ) ( )p pI IIπ π< .                 (A-3) 
To guarantee * ( )pM IV 1< , we have  
p os s 3t 3 kγ− < − − .                                      (A-4) 
Compare * ( )p IVπ  with * ( )p Iπ :  
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s s t k 2t 2 k
s s t k 2t k
γ γ− + − − − −=− + − −  
                        Î ( )( )p o
k 2t k 2t k 2
s s
2
γ+ − − −− =              (A-5)  
                      , where 
( )( )k 2t k 2t k 2
t t
2
γγ + − − −− < < .  
Therefore, it can be derived that: 
( )( )
p o
k 2t k 2t k 2
s s
2
γ+ − − −− <  Î * *( ) ( )p pIV Iπ π<         (A-6).  
Combining A-6 with A-3, we have  
( )( )
p o
k 2t k 2t k 2
s s
2
γ+ − − −− < Î * * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p p p pIII IV I IIπ π π π< < < .  
Proposition 3.2 is thus proved. 
 
From (A-5), it can also be derived: 
( )( )
p o
k 2t k 2t k 2
s s
2
γ+ − − −− > Î * *( ) ( )p pIV Iπ π> .    (A-7)  
Under such a case, to decide the sequence of the profit under different strategies, we need 
to compare * ( )p Iπ  with * ( )p IIIπ , and compare * ( )p IVπ  with * ( )p IIπ . 
First, compare * ( )p Iπ  with * ( )p IIIπ : 
* *( ) ( )p pI IIIπ π= Î ( )( )p os s t 2t k 2t k γ− = + − − −  
Thus, we know that: 
( )( )p os s t 2t k 2t k γ− > + − − − Î *( ) *( )III Iπ π> .             (A-8)  
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Since ( )( )t 2t k 2t k 3t k 3t 3 kγ γ γ+ − − − > − − > − − , we can know that (A-8) contradict 
with (A-4). Therefore, we have:  
*( ) *( )III Iπ π< .                              (A-9) 
Secondly, compare * ( )p IVπ  with * ( )p IIπ : 
* *( ) ( )p pIV IIπ π= Î ( )( )p os s t 2t k 2t kγ γ γ γ− = − + − − − − −  
We can get that 
( )( )p os s t 2t k 2t kγ γ γ γ− > − + − − − − − Î *( ) *( )IV IIπ π> .       (A-10)           
Since ( )( )t 2t k 2t k 3t 3 kγ γ γ γ γ− + − − − − − > − − , we know that (A-10) contradict 
with (A-4). Therefore, it can be derived that  
*( ) *( )IV IIπ π< .                              (A-11) 
Combining (A-3), (A-7), (A-9) and (A-11), it can be derived that 
( )( )
p o
k 2t k 2t k 2
s s
2
γ+ − − −− > Î * * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p p p pIII I IV IIπ π π π< < < . 
Proposition 3.3 is thus proved. 
Proposition 3.2 and proposition 3.3 lead to proposition 3.1 spontaneously. 
2A.1.2. Partly Covered Market  
• Equal base-level qualities  
Table 2.2 reports the equilibrium outcomes of the partly covered market when open 
source and proprietary software have equal base-level qualities.  From Table 2.2, we have: 
*( ) *( ) *( ) *( )p III p IV p II p I= < = ,                   (A-12) 
* * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p p p pM III M IV M II M I= < < .                  (A-13) 
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By (A-12) and (A-13), it can be derived that *( ) *( ) *( ) *( )III IV II Iπ π π π= < < . 
• Different base-level qualities 
 
Table 2.4 reports the equilibrium outcomes of the partly covered market when open 
source and proprietary software have different base-level qualities.  From Table 2. 4, we 
have: 
*( ) *( ) *( ) *( )p III p IV p II p I= < = ,                   (A-14) 
* * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p p p pM III M IV M II M I= < < .                  (A-15) 
By (A-14) and (A-15), it can be derived that *( ) *( ) *( ) *( )III IV II Iπ π π π= < < . 
Such results are the same as those when open source and proprietary software products 
have equal base-level quality.  Therefore, the proposition 2 is proved. 
Proposition 2 and proposition 3.1 prove proposition 1 spontaneously. 
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Appendix 2.2. Calculation of the Welfare 
When the market is fully covered, the proprietary software producer will choose inward 
compatibility.  Under such a scenario, the welfare denoted as W is calculated as: 
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Appendix 2.3. Proof of Proposition 4 
2A.3.1. Fully Covered Market 
Suppose the open source software aims at maximizing market share and the proprietary 
software pursues the maximum profits.  And suppose that they choose the compatibility 
strategy simultaneously.  The payoffs under each strategy are listed in Table 2A.1.  The 
first number in each cell is the market share of the open source software, and the second 
number is the profit of the proprietary software.  
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Table 2A.1: Fully Covered Market: Competition Outcomes   
 
The Nash equilibrium can be solved as (Compatible, Compatible). Therefore, when the 
market is fully covered, both open source and proprietary software will choose to be 












2A.3.2. Partly Covered Market 
Similarly, when the market is not fully covered, the payoffs under each strategy are listed 
in Table 2A.2.  
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Table 2A.2: Partly Covered Market: Competition Outcomes   
 
The Nash equilibrium can be solved as (compatible, compatible). Therefore, when the 
market is not fully covered, both open source and proprietary software will choose to be 
compatible with their rival, which leads to two-way compatibility.  
              Proprietary Software 
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Appendix 2.4. Proof of Proposition 5 
2A.4.1. Incompatibility 
When two software products are incompatible, the equilibrium outcomes of the 
proprietary software are listed in the following table, where the second row is the case of 
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Table 2A.3: The Comparison of Two Cases Where Two Products Are Incompatible 
 
First, comparing the equilibrium price under two cases, it can be derived that: 
t k t
2
γ γ− − < − .                         (A-17) 
Second, comparing the market share under two cases, it is obtained: 
[ ( ) ]
t k 1
2 2 t k 2
γ
γ
− − <− − .                       (A-18) 
From (A-17) and (A-18), we can get:  
( )
[ ( ) ]
2t k t
4 2 t k 2
γ γ
γ
− − −<− − . 
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Therefore, the equilibrium profit of the “proprietary vs. proprietary” case is higher than 
that of the “open vs. proprietary” case. 
 
2A.4.2. Two-way Compatibility 
Table 2A.4 shows the equilibrium price, market share and the profit of the proprietary 




Market Share Profit 




















Table 2A.4: The Comparison of Two Cases Where Two Products Are Compatible 
 
It is straightforward that the equilibrium profit under the “proprietary vs. proprietary” 
case is higher than that under “open vs. proprietary” case. 
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Appendix 2.5. Proof of Proposition 6 
2A.5.1. Social Welfare: Proprietary vs. Proprietary 
Suppose that the market is fully covered and two software products are two-way 
compatible. The equilibrium price, market share and profits are shown as follows: 
* *
1 2










= = , 
where the footnote 1 and 2 denotes the first proprietary and the second proprietary 
software respectively. 
Using ppW  to denote the welfare when two proprietary software products compete 
together, we have: 
* *
( ) [ ( ) ]
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2A.5.2. Social Welfare: Open vs. Proprietary 
When two proprietary software compete together and one of them changes to open source 
software, we suppose that it aims at market share maximization.  Therefore, the best 
strategy is two-way compatibility.  Using opW  to denote the welfare, we have: 
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    2A.5.3. Social Welfare: “Open vs. Proprietary” vs. “Proprietary vs. Proprietary” 
From A-19 and A-21, we can get: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )







t t k 2k t 3t k t 7t 3k t k tW W s s
2 2t k 8 2t k 4
t k 3t k
4 2t k
γ γ− − − + − −− = + − + − − +− −
− + −               = −
   (A-22) 
Therefore, we have: 
( )3 2t k 3t k> − Î op ppW W< ,  
( )3 2t k 3t k< − Î op ppW W>  
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CHAPTER 3 THE VALUE OF IT TO FIRMS IN A 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY IN THE CATCH-UP PROCESS: 
AN EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF CHINA AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
3.1. Introduction  
With the coming of the information age, information technology (IT) investments are 
becoming increasingly important to firms’ survival and growth (Bharadwaj 2000).  In 
particular, Asian firms have grown successfully with the help of IT (Amsden 2001, Enos 
et al. 1997, Hobday 1995, Kim 1997, Lall 2000, Mathews and Cho 2000).  Such 
successes have obviously boosted the confidence of firms in developing countries.  
Indeed, many developing countries have turned to IT as a way to propel economic growth 
(Song 2000, Splettstoesser 1996, Talero 1994, Thong, 1999).  
 
The catch-up theory (Gerschenkron 1962) explains the successes of firms in developing 
countries: developing countries can skip several stages of development and directly adopt 
advanced technologies.  In particular, technologies are "short cuts" by which developing 
countries may "catch up" with developed countries.   
 
Information technology could act as the shortcut suggested in the catch-up theory.  By 
adopting IT that has been proven to be successful in developed countries, firms in 
developing countries may grow faster than those in developed countries.   
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Many researchers believe that the rise of Asian firms is related to the development of IT.  
However, some scholars have been skeptical about the role of IT in the catch-up process.  
They argued that IT adoption and implementation in developing countries face a broad 
range of obstacles, such as inadequate IT infrastructure, lack of communication, and 
ineffective policies (Dasgupta et al. 1999, Dewan and Kraemer 2000, Sauvant 1984).  
Homer-Dixon (1991) even reported that the gap between developing countries and 
developed countries is widening, owing to slow IT adoption and diffusion.  
 
Puzzled by these arguments, researchers and practitioners are struggling to collect 
empirical evidence to determine whether IT propels the catch-up processes of firms in 
developing countries, and if so, to find out which factors may affect IT value.  Although 
some studies have documented successful cases of latecomer firms in Asia (Amsden 
2001, Kim 1995, 1997, Lall 2000), little literature in the field has focused on the role of 
IT in the catch-up process.  Besides, most of the previous studies on IT value were 
limited to US cases (Dos Santos et al. 1993, Im et al. 2001).  We do not know whether 
their results are applicable to developing countries, especially those in the catch-up 
process.   
 
China has maintained rapid economic growth, especially in the IT industry, in spite of the 
Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, and the subsequent global economic slowdown.  
IT growth in China may therefore represent the rapid adoption of IT by latecomer firms 
in developing countries.  In contrast, US firms are leaders of the market.  They would 
have profited from first-mover advantages (Shapiro and Varian 1998) through high 
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research and development (R&D) expenditure.  Hence, the comparative studies of IT 
value to firms in these two countries can offer insight on whether IT plays a significant 
role in the latecomer firms’ catch-up process or not.   
 
This study aims to assess the value of IT investments to firms in China, a developing 
country actively engaged in the catch-up process.  I employ the event study methodology 
and compare the empirical impact of IT investments in China with that in the US.  I shall 
investigate the following questions: (1) Can IT increase firms’ value in a developing 
country (China) and in a developed country (US) respectively? (2) Does IT really provide 
an opportunity for firms in a developing country to catch up with those in a developed 
one? (3) How do various context factors (such as industry, size and type) affect the catch-
up process?   
 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows: I present four hypotheses about the market 
value of IT investments in Section 3.2.  Section 3.3 briefly explains the methodology of 
event study.  Section 3.4 describes the data collection procedure.  The empirical results 
follow in Section 3.5.  Section 3.6 discusses the findings.  Section 3.7 concludes the essay 
with a summary of its contributions and a discussion of directions for future work. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
3.2.1. Overall IT Investment Effect 
IT is believed to automate processes (Zuboff 1988), change business strategies (Malone 
et al. 1987), and smooth the daily operation of firms (Dos Santos et al. 1993).  Given the 
 64
tangible and intangible value of IT, IT investments should bring benefits to firms. Yet 
previous empirical studies in the US have failed to support such a claim (Dos Santos et al. 
1993, Im et al. 2001).  One possible reason is the high risk of IT investments in the US.  
It is reported that over 80% of IT projects in the US failed (The Standish Group 1995).  
Another possible reason is the high competitive pressure.  Dos Santos et al. (1993) 
posited that only early adopters of IT applications can reap first-mover benefits.  For the 
other firms, IT investments become necessities rather than value creators (Clemons and 
Row 1991).  
 
The disadvantages that US firms seem to face in IT adoption may not apply to firms in 
China for a number of reasons. Firstly, the catch-up theory indicates that technology 
development in developing countries lags behind that in developed countries.  This gives 
a good opportunity for firms in developing counties to identify which is the most 
effective technology to adopt, and at which stage they should enter IT adoption.  
Therefore, the risk of failure may be significantly lower for firms in developing countries.  
For instance, firms in the US implemented material requirement planning (MRP) to 
manage  resources in the early 1960s.  This technology subsequently developed into 
manufacturing resource planning (MRP II), and finally evolved into enterprise resource 
planning (ERP).  While US firms would have implemented MRP, MRPII, and eventually, 
ERP over the years, most firms in China could simply leap over MRP and MRPII and 
implement ERP directly. 
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Secondly, although the technologies learnt and adopted by firms in developing countries 
may not be the most advanced in developed countries, they would be new and innovative 
in the local market of the adopting firm.  It has been noted that competitive pressure is 
statistically significant for firms in the US but not for those in China (Zhu and Kraemer 
2005, Xu et al. 2004).  This indicates that in China, firms adopt IT not to avoid 
competitive decline but to gain the competitive advantage.  Thus, I propose the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1(a):  Announcements of IT investments cause positive abnormal returns 
for firms in China.  
Hypothesis 1(b):  Announcements of IT investments do not cause positive abnormal 
returns for firms in the U.S.  
 
3.2.2. Industry Effect 
Prior studies have shown that IT investments do not exhibit significant difference 
between the manufacturing and financial industries in the US (Dos Santos et al. 1993, Im 
et al. 2001) 10.  However, industry effect should be expected in China because the catch-
up process is more intense in the manufacturing sector (Amsden 1989, Hobday 1995, 
Kim 1997, Lall 1982).   
 
A series of research shows that the catch up process of Central and Eastern European 
countries and Asian countries present unbalanced growth (Ark and Timmer 2003, Ark 
                                                 
10 In the US stock market, SIC codes are used to indicate the industry type of firms.  China has a similar 
classification in the market index portfolio. 
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and Piatkowski 2003).  The manufacturing sector continues to drive much more of the 
overall productivity growth than non-manufacturing sector. 
Furthermore, structural change is a key factor for productivity growth (Lucas 1993 and 
Versepagen 1993).  When there is a transition from socialist centrally planned to a market 
economy, the major restructuring happens in the manufacturing sector (Ark and 
Piatkowski 2003).  In contrast, the restructuring in the non-manufacturing sector is more 
complicated and requires bigger changes in the economic environment (Ark et al. 2002).   
The problem is more pronounced in China.  The Chinese government is changing the 
structure of the finance industry gradually.  A few big issues are delaying the 
development of the whole financial services industry.  For instance, China lacks a social 
credit system.  The information asymmetry in the China financial market is more severe 
than that in the US, which directly affects trust building in transactions.  Concerning the 
cross-country and cross-industry difference, I propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2(a):  In China, the reaction of stock prices to the announcements 
of IT investments is greater for manufacturing firms than for financial firms. 
Hypothesis 2(b):   In the US, the reaction of stock prices to the 




3.2.3. Firm Size Effect 
The relationship between firm size11 and IT has been investigated from different aspects 
in the IS field (Dewan et al. 1998, Brynjolfsson 1994, Richardson and Zmud 2001, Im et 
al. 2001).  Theoretically, firm size may affect the adoption of IT in opposite ways.  On 
the one hand, IT influences the scale and scope of economies, which favors large-sized 
firms because large-sized firms usually have ample resources (Dewan et al. 1998).  This 
is defined as resource advantage (Zhu et al. 2004).  On the other hand, Richardson and 
Zmud (2001) state that the competitive advantage brought by IT is more likely sustained 
in small-sized firms since they are more agile.  The greater structural inertia associated 
with large-sized firms requires more effort to implement IT (Nohria and Gulati 1996). 
 
In the US market, I expect firm size effect to be a mix of resource advantage and 
structural inertia and, in balance, the two factors may cancel each other out.  China, 
however, was a socialist economy for several decades, and began changing into a market 
economy in recent years.  Most large firms are still state-owned, and the structural inertia 
is more distinct in these firms (Xu et al. 2004).  As a result, small-sized firms would 
benefit more from IT investments.  Thus, I posit the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3(a):  In China, the reaction of stock prices to the announcements 
of IT investments is greater for small-sized firms than for large-sized firms. 
Hypothesis 3(b):  In the US, the reaction of stock prices to the 
announcements of IT investments is no greater for small-sized firms than for large-sized 
firms. 
                                                 
11 Based on prior studies (Im et al. 2001), firm size is measured by market capitalization. 
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3.2.4. Firm Type Effect 
The value of IT in the IT-using industry and the IT-producing industry 12  has been 
investigated separately in prior studies for developed countries (Dedrick et al. 2003).  
Some studies have observed the positive value of IT in the IT-producing industry 
(Gordon 2000, Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000) while others acknowledged the value of IT in 
the IT-using industry (Triplett and Bosworth 2003).  I thus expect that IT value has no 
significant difference in these two sub-samples in the US. 
 
In contrast, I expect piracy to seriously affect IT value in the IT-producing industry in 
China.  Unlike the US, China faces rampant piracy of intellectual property.  Although the 
Chinese government recognizes the importance of protecting intellectual property and has 
developed copyright laws, the implementation of these laws has proven lacking, due 
largely to difficulties in enforcement.  Compared with IT-using firms, IT-producing firms 
are more undermined by piracy as they are technology-oriented and operate in higher 
technology intensity.  Without effective enforcement of copyright laws, leading 
technologies can be easily duplicated, and leader firms would lose their first-mover 
advantages in the local Chinese market.  Therefore, the impact of IT investments in IT-
producing firms may not be as significant as that in IT-using firms in China, leading to 
the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 4(a):   The reaction of stock prices to announcements of IT 
investments for IT-using firms is larger than that for IT-producing firms in China. 
                                                 
12 Here, the IT-producing industry includes software and hardware producing firms, and IT service 
providers. All other firms belong to the IT-using industry.  
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Hypothesis 4(b):   The reaction of stock prices to announcements of IT 
investments for IT-using firms is no larger than that for IT-producing firms in the US.  
 
3.3. Methodology 
Consistent with prior studies on the United States (Dos Santos et al. 1993, Im et al. 2001), 
the methodology applied in this paper is event study methodology.  Changes in stock 
prices associated with IT investment announcements are deemed the discounted value of 
future net cash flow, which is the true contribution of IT investments to firms.  By linking 
market value directly to IT investments, we can eliminate the effect of other factors that 
cannot be properly measured (Dos Santos et al. 1993, Im et al. 2001). 
First, I construct a model of share price relative to market index, which is specified as an 
equation (3.1). The parameters in the model are estimated by historical data.  The market 
model is specified as follows: 
  , , ,i t i i m t i tR Rα β ε= + +                                                         (3.1)                       
,i tR  is the rate of return for firm i on day t and , , ,( ) ,( )( ) /i t i t i t 1 i t 1R Price Price Price− −= − ; 
,m tR  is the average of returns for all firms in the stock market; iα and iβ are the intercept 
and the slope parameters for  firm i; and ti,ε represents the error term for firm i on day t. 
iα and iβ are estimated over T days, where T(=200) begins 230 days before the 
announcement day (event day)  and ends 30 days before the announcement day13.  
 
                                                 
13 The 30 days’ data before event window day are deleted in case there is information leakage. 
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Second, I choose a three-day event window (beginning on the event day and ending two 
days after the event day).  I assume that any abnormal returns in the event window days 
are the result of the announcement.  The abnormal returns of firm i on event day t are 
computed as: 
, , ,
ˆˆ( )i t i t i i m tAR R Rα β= − +                                                                      (3.2) 
Finally, I check whether the average abnormal returns in the event window days are 
statistically significant; I proceed as follows: 








= ∑                                                                                      (3.3) 







= ∑                                                                                    (3.4) 

















⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥= + +⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑
                                                    (3.5) 
(Judge et al. 1988), where 2iS is the residual return variance from the estimation of the 
market model over the T days before the announcement period, mR  represents the mean 
return of the whole market over the estimation period, ,m tR  is the return of the market on 
day t during the estimation period, and ,mR τ  is the market return on day τ in the event 
window. 
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=                                                                                       (3.8)   
with T-1(=199) degree of freedom (Campbell et al. 1997, Subramani and Walden 2001). 
 
3.4. Data Collection 
To compare US firms and China firms, I consider data from the same period of 1999 to 
2002 for both countries.  In the US, there are many available databases carrying news of 
IT investments.  I use Factiva as the main database.  To collect news on IT investment 
announcements of firms traded on the US stock exchanges (such as NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ), I searched the Factiva database from 1999 to 2002.  The target news sources 
were Business Wire, PR Newswire, Dow Jones Business News and Dow Jones 
International News.  A full text search was done using the keywords: “computer”, 
“software”, “hardware”, “investment” and “purchase”, which yielded more than 4,000 
items of news.  I selected the data by reading the details of the news.  Having done that, 
historical stock prices were collected from finance.yahoo.com.  To find out the SIC codes 
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and past assets of the firms, I further conducted a search in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
Merged database.  I used the S&P 500 index to calculate the return of the market 
portfolio. 
 
For China, news of IT investment announcements were collected from five of the most 
well-known Chinese stock news web sites (www.p5w.net, www.stocknews.com.cn,  
finance.eastday.com, www.cs.com.cn, and www.my0578.com).  These five web sites 
cover all core news related to China’s stock market.  Using the keyword, “IT 
investments”, I found more than 3,300 matches of IT announcement news.  Then, I 
examined the titles to ensure that the news item was actually related to IT investments.  
After this, I checked the event date by comparing the dates from different sources.  If a 
piece of news appeared in different sources, I used the earliest one as the event date.  The 
return of the market was calculated by the simple average returns of all 943 companies in 
the stock market.  I obtained the historical stock prices of the firms from the Daily Stock 
Returns File of China.  
 
In the process of computation, I needed at least 233 days of stock prices to predict the 
returns during the event window.  Some stocks were too new to have enough historical 
prices.  These stocks were eliminated.  Next, firms with more than one announcement on 
the event day were excluded, which left 63 firms for the US stock market and 65 firms 
for the China market.  
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3.5. Results  
3.5.1 Overall Effects of IT Investment Announcements 
Table 3.1 reports the CAR and test results of the 65 samples from China and the 63 
samples from the US.  From the table, one can see that CAR is positive for both China 
and the US.  However, CAR was significantly different from zero for China but 
insignificant for the US.  This implies that IT investment announcements can 
significantly increase firms’ value in China, a developing country in the catch-up 
processes, but not in the US.  Thus, both Hypothesis 1(a) and Hypothesis 1(b) are 
accepted.  
Full Sample CAR  ( )VAR CAR  t-statistics 
China  (n=65) 1.077815 0.117171 3.148728** 
The United States 
(n=63) 
0.003701 6.45096E-05 0.460805 
**significant at the 1% level 
      Table 3.1: Test Results: Overall Effect  
3.5.2 Industry Effect  
To test for industry effect, I divided the samples of each country into two groups: 
manufacturing firms and financial firms.  Table 2 reports the CAR of manufacturing firms 
and financial firms in the two countries.  One can see that IT investment announcements 
can significantly increase the market value of manufacturing firms but not financial firms 
in China, although the t-statistic of the difference between the manufacturing firms and 
financial firms is insignificant.  In contrast, for the US, both sub-samples show 
 74
insignificant results, indicating that industry effect cannot be observed in the sample of 
the US at all.  As a result, Hypothesis 2(a) is rejected and Hypothesis 2(b) is accepted.              
Sample Category CAR  ( )VAR CAR  t-statistics 
Manufacturing firms 
in China (n=41) 
1.347909 0.172963 3.24104** 
Non-manufacturing firms 
in China(n=24) 
0.616405 0.354679 1.035019 
Difference between two sub-samples
In China 
0.731504 0.52764 1.007 
Manufacturing firms 
In the United States (n=32) 
0.00454 0.000143 0.379268 
Non-manufacturing firms 
In the United States (n=31) 
0.002835 0.000114 0.265826 
Difference between two sub-samples
In the United States 
0.00171 0.000257 0.10667 
**significant at the 1% level 
Table 3.2: Test Results: Industry Effect  
 
3.5.3 Firm Size Effect 
The test results for firm size effect are reported in Table 3.  For China, the CAR of small-
sized firms is statistically significant while that of large-sized firms is insignificant.  
However, the t-statistic of the difference between small-sized firms and large-sized firms 
is insignificant.  In contrast, large-sized firms in the US show significantly negative 
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abnormal returns while small-sized firms show insignificantly positive abnormal returns.  
The difference between these two sub-samples is significant.  Such results show that IT 
investments can trigger opposite reactions for different firm sizes in different countries.  
Both Hypothesis 3(a) and Hypothesis 3(b) are rejected.                
Sample Category CAR  ( )VAR CAR  t-statistics 
Large-sized firms 
in China (n=22) 
-0.3385 2.348401 -0.22089 
Small-sized firms 
in China (n=43) 
1.398489 0.137648 3.769419** 
Difference between two sub-samples
in China 
-1.736989 2.486049 -1.10164 
Large-sized firms 
In the United States (n=15) 
-0.02713 0.000154 -2.18326* 
Small-sized firms 
In the United States (n=48) 
0.013336 9.60465E-05 1.360801 
Difference between two sub-samples
In the United States 
-0.040466 0.00025 -2.55929** 
**significant at the 1% level    *significant at the 5% level 
 Table 3.3: Test Results: Firm Size Effect  
3.5.4 Firm Type Effect 
To test for firm type effect, I divided the samples into IT-producing firms and IT-using 
firms.  The CAR and t-statistic value of these two types of firms are reported in Table 4.  
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In China, the CAR for IT-using firms is significantly positive while the CAR for IT-
producing firms is statistically insignificant.  The difference between these two sub-
samples is statistically significant.  In contrast, in the US, I cannot infer significant 
reactions in either sub-sample; the difference is also insignificant.  This implies that both 
Hypothesis 4(a) and Hypothesis 4(b) are accepted. 
           
Sample Category CAR  ( )VAR CAR  t-statistics 
IT-using firms 
in China (n=39) 
1.572932 0.20841 3.44549** 
IT-producing firms 
in China (n=26) 
0.335141 0.263394 0.653017 
Difference between two sub 
Samples in China 
1.237791 0.471804 1.80204* 
IT-using firms 
in the United States (n=33) 
0.000187 9.699E-05 0.019035 
IT-producing firms 
in the United States (n=30) 
0.007566 0.000252 0.476427 
Difference between two sub-
samples in the United States 
-0.007753 0.00034899 -0.415 
**significant at the 1% level    *significant at the 5% level 
Table 3.4: Test Results: Firm Type Effect 
 
All the results of testing the hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.5 
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Hypotheses Supported
H1(a):   Announcements of IT investments cause positive abnormal returns 
for firms in China. Yes 
H1(b):   Announcements of IT investments do not cause positive abnormal 
returns for firms in the U.S. Yes 
H2(a):   In China, the reaction of stock prices to the announcements of IT 
investments is greater for manufacturing firms than for financial firms. No 
H2(b):   In the US, the reaction of stock prices to the announcements of IT 
investments is no greater for manufacturing firms than for financial firms. 
 
Yes 
H3(a):   In China, the reaction of stock prices to the announcements of IT 
investments is greater for small-sized firms than for large-sized firms. 
 
No 
H3(b):   In the US, the reaction of stock prices to the announcements of IT 
investments is no greater for small-sized firms than for large-sized firms. 
 
No 
H4(a):    The reaction of stock prices to announcements of IT investments for 
IT-using firms is larger than that for IT-producing firms in China. 
 
Yes 
H4(b):    The reaction of stock prices to announcements of IT investments for 
IT-using firms is no larger than that for IT-producing firms in the US. 
 
Yes 
Table 3.5: Summary: Test Results of the Hypotheses 
 
3.6. Discussion  
The main finding is that IT investment announcements significantly increase firms’ 
market value in China but not in the US.  The increase in market value can be deemed  as 
the net present value that has resulted from the expected profits of IT investments (Dos 
Santos et al. 1993).  In other words, IT investments can benefit firms in China but not in 
the US, which could explain the successful catch-up process of China. 
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China clearly lags behind the US in IT development. The US began research on the 
Internet in the 1960s, and constructed the first generation of the Internet in 1986. In 
contrast, China set up its Internet structure in 1994. Firms in the US began using MRP to 
plan enterprise resources in the 1960s while firms in China began implementing ERP in 
the 1990s. The US e-government was established in the early 1990s while the e-
government in China has been developed only in the past five years. These lags indicate 
the technological gaps between developed countries and developing countries.    
 
Early adoption of new technologies may provide certain opportunities to leader firms – 
the so-called first-mover advantages. It enables leader firms to lock in consumers before 
competitors enter the market (Shapiro and Varian 1998). It allows leader firms to 
establish the technology standard, and using the installed consumer bases, to maximize 
network externalities so that latecomer firms may have serious difficulties in competing 
against them.  However, the problem for early comers is that it is very difficult to be a 
winner and enjoy the advantages. As I have noted, over 80% of IT projects in the US 
failed. 
 
Latecomer firms in developed countries can reduce the risks of IT investments by 
adopting mature technologies rather than new technologies. However, mature 
technologies invariably mean strong incumbents who are enjoying first-mover 
advantages in the market.  Therefore, latecomer firms in developed countries would face 
difficulties competing against early comer firms. 
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However, latecomer firms in China may not necessarily compete against leader firms in 
the US directly.  Therefore, the disadvantages as latecomers may not so serious because 
the firms can adopt the technologies that have been proven successful in the US for their 
business in China. Compared with the big traditional firms in China which mainly rely on  
manpower, those China firms investing in IT can use IT as leverage to enhance their 
performance and increase productivity, and thus win the competitive advantage in the 
China market.   
 
The catch-up process can be more easily observed among manufacturing firms than 
among financial firms in China, although there is no evidence that industry difference 
exists.  The possible reason is that compared with manufacturing firms, financial firms 
require comparatively more communication, coordination and dependence with others. 
The developing status of the whole China financial services industry may affect the 
results of individual firms’ IT investments.   
 
In China, IT investments can increase the market value of small-sized firms but not that 
of large-sized firms.  Surprisingly, in the US, large-sized firms have significantly 
negative abnormal returns.  Combining with the results of prior research – Im et al. (2001) 
who posited insignificant negative abnormal returns of large-sized firms, and Xu et al. 
(2004) who demonstrated that firm size slows e-business adoption in the US – I may 
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expect that structural inertia dominates the resource advantage of large-sized firms in the 
US. 
 
I have found strong evidence that the value of IT varies with respect to type of firm.  IT-
using firms in China are more likely to catch up successfully with leader firms in 
developed countries, but the outlook may not be so optimistic for IT-producing firms.  
Rampant piracy seriously affects the growth of IT-producing firms in China.  The US 
software industry reported that up to 98% of copies of US software products sold in  
China were unlicensed or pirated copies.  A big proportion of gains from IT products in 
China are cannibalized by illegal copies, which affects the profits of IT investments.    
This serves as a reminder that, for China, the enactment of laws protecting intellectual 
property is only the first step to keeping its long-term growth.  How to enforce these laws 
and protect the technology investment environment is key to the success of the catch-up 
process.  
 
3.7. Conclusions  
I have studied IT payoff from the perspective of the catch-up process.  Using actual data 
of firm performance, I have compared IT value in two big economies (China vs. the US).  
The difference in the pattern of IT value in China and the US indicates that IT could be 
the technology shortcut through which firms in developing countries could grow more 
quickly. Thus, the gap between developing and developed counties could narrow with 
technology.  The result could serve as a good explanation of the fast growth of the China 
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economy in recent years.  It is also of empirical implication for other developing 
countries in the aspect of IT investments. The low efficiency of IT investments in the 
financial services industry compared with the manufacturing industry, and that in the IT-
producing industry compared with that in the IT-using industry, may also serve as a 
reminder to policy makers in China that a more healthy IT investment environment is 
needed. 
 
This study contributes to the current research in advancing a theory on IT value to firms 
by incorporating the country dimension.  It is interesting that contextual factors, such as 
industry, firm size, and firm type, affect IT value in different ways in developing 
countries and developed countries.  Empirically, such results are of useful implications 
for firms operating in various types of countries.  Academically, it implies the necessity 
to check whether the conclusions of IT value research derived from US data are also 
applicable to developing countries.  
 
As a final note, I acknowledge that this study provides only one successful example of 
the catch-up theory. Gaps remain between developing countries and developed countries, 
and they may not always be good for the developing countries. 
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CHAPTER 4 GALLERY FEATURE IN EBAY: 
ADVERTISING OR SIGNALING 
4.1. Introduction 
Founded in 1995, eBay describes itself as “The World's Online Marketplace”.  EBay has 
now grown to 135.5 million registered members from around the world, with annual sales 
of $34.2 billion in 2004. 14  Other large U.S. online auction services include Yahoo 
Auction (founded in 1999) and Amazon Auction.  Online auction services outside the 
U.S. include eBid in the UK, QXL Ricardo in Europe, and Taobao in China.  
 Online auction markets have been in existence for sufficiently long that business 
practices among buyers and sellers should now be quite mature.  Since these markets are 
very transparent, they are a good context in which to measure the impact of the various 
elements of the marketing mix. 
 EBay and Yahoo Auctions apply a second price auction.  Upon paying an 
insertion fee, a seller can list auction items for a fixed period with a public start bid price 
and, possibly, a secret reserve price.  Sellers also have the option of setting a fixed price 
at which the items may be bought without bidding.  If the auction is successful, eBay will 
collect a commission of about 5.25% of the closing value from the seller.   
 Both eBay and Yahoo Auctions offer various optional features with which sellers 
may promote their items.  In eBay, these features include: “Gallery”, which inserts a 
large picture of the items being sold; “Highlight”, which emphasizes the seller’s listing 
                                                 
14 Source: EBay. Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2004 Financial Results, 2004 
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with an eye-catching purple colored band; “Bold”, which uses different fonts for the titles 
of the items; and “Border”, which adds a gray frame around the seller’s listing.   
 
Generally, the objective of advertising is to increase demand and hence enable the seller 
to increase profit.  Accordingly, a key tool in advertising strategy is the sales-response 
function, which measures the impact of advertising expenditure on sales revenue. 
 In this essay, I focus on sellers’ use of the Gallery feature in eBay auctions for 
several consumer products to gauge the sales-response function, and to explore what 
underlies the sales-response function.  The hedonic method is applied to examine 
Gallery’s impact on the sales-response function.  I recorded sellers’ information and 
auction results for 12 products and 6148 individual auctions.  It was found that the 
auctions with Gallery feature attract more bids and achieve a higher final auction price 
than those without.  Hence, Gallery can be an effective advertising tool and bring benefit 
to sellers.   
 Furthermore, I examine whether the Gallery feature serves as signal.  In the online 
context, sellers have private information about the items that they sell, and buyers are 
uninformed.  Signaling is a way by which informed parties can credibly communicate 
their information to uninformed parties.  It was found that sellers’ quality is related to the 
Gallery feature for high-priced products.   
 The rest of the essay is organized as follows: section 4.2 provides the theoretical 
background.  Section 4.3 proposes the hypotheses.  In section 4.4, I describe the data 
collection procedures.  The test results are presented in section 4.5.  Finally, I discuss the 
results and implications of this study in section 4.6.     
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4.2. Theory 
Generally, advertising raises the demand for an item and also causes buyers to be less 
price-sensitive.  Accordingly, if the Gallery feature serves an advertising function, 
auctions with the Gallery feature should attract more bids and exhibit more intense 
competition.  If the competition is more intense, the likelihood that the highest bid will 
fall below the seller’s reserve price will be lower, and hence the probability that the item 
will be sold would be higher.  Further, the closing price should be higher.  Thus, if the 
Gallery feature serves an advertising function, auctions with the Gallery feature should: 
• Exhibit more intense competition; 
• Be more likely to succeed; and  
• End with a higher price. 
 
 Another possible explanation for sellers’ use of the Gallery feature is to signal 
their attributes.  Asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers is more serious in 
online markets than conventional markets.  In an online context, buyers cannot inspect 
the item for sale and do not meet the seller in person.  Accordingly, a key issue in online 
markets is how to resolve the information asymmetry and establish trust between buyers 
and sellers.    
 A key way by which eBay mitigates this asymmetry of information is the 
feedback mechanisms.  In eBay, after each transaction, both the buyer and seller are 
required to provide an assessment (positive, negative or neutral) of the trading partner.  
They even can leave detailed comments, such as “Fast delivery and great seller”.  These 
assessments comprise the permanent feedback record of each seller, which is presented 
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just beside each person’s eBay ID.  The feedback record includes the Positive Score, 
Negative Score, Feedback Score and Positive Ratio. 15   These feedback mechanisms 
induce trust and provide reputable sellers with a price premium (Ba and Pavlou 2002, 
Lucking-Reiley et al. 2000, Melnik and Alm 2002). 
 
But, what if the seller’s feedback record does not fully resolve the informational 
asymmetry?  This would be particularly true considering that hundreds of sellers list side 
by side in eBay.  It is costly for buyer to check the feedback record for each seller.  
Signaling is a way by which an informed party may credibly communicate its private 
information.  Various practices have been explained in terms of signaling – these include 
advertising (Nelson 1970), branding (Erdem and Swait 1998), warranties (Grossman 
1981) and product pricing (Wolinsky 1983).  Could the seller’s use of the Gallery feature 
serve to signal seller quality? 
 
For something to be a credible signal of seller quality, the signal must be more costly for 
sellers with lower quality.  In eBay, sellers with inferior feedback record should attract 
less intense bidding, and hence be less likely to sell their item, and would attract a lower 
price.  Since the fee for the Gallery feature is not refundable, lower quality sellers have 
less incentive to use the feature.  Thus, it is possible to assume that sellers use Gallery as 
a signal.  
 
                                                 
15 Feedback Score=Positive Score-Negative Score; Positive Ratio=Positive Score/(Positive score + 
Negative score).  In eBay, Feedback Score and Positive Ratio are listed just beside each ID.  By 
clicking the ID, trading parties can see the Positive Score and Negative Score with detailed comments.  
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If the Gallery feature serves a signaling function, auctions with the Gallery feature should 
attract more bidders.  Consequently, the empirical implications of the Gallery feature are 
similar to those arising if Gallery serves an advertising function. 
 
How can the advertising and signaling theories be distinguished?  The distinction relates 
to the necessary condition for signaling.  Relatively more high-quality than low-quality 
sellers should use the signal.  
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis addresses the use of the Gallery feature for either advertising or 
signaling. 
Hypothesis 1.   Auctions with the Gallery feature should: 
(a) Exhibit more intense competition; 
(b) Be more likely to succeed; and  
(c) End with a higher price. 
The predictions underlying Hypothesis 1 are consistent with both the advertising and 
signaling theories.   
 
In the above theoretical section, I have argued that, Gallery may serve as an effective 
quality signal.  If so, the Gallery feature should be used by relatively more high-quality 
than low-quality sellers.  This prediction can be operationalized through the seller’s 
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“Positive Ratio”, which is the seller’s Positive Score divided by the sum of the seller’s 
Positive Score and Negative Score.  Using the Positive Ratio to measure the seller’s 
quality, the signaling theory predicts:   
Hypothesis 2.   Sellers with higher Positive Ratio are more likely to use Gallery 
compared with those with lower Positive Ratio. 
The seller’s quality can also be operationalized by the Feedback Score (Positive Score 
minus Negative Score), which represents seller’s experience and reputation.  Thus, the 
signaling theory expects:  
Hypothesis 3.   Sellers with higher Feedback Score are more likely to use Gallery 
compared with those with lower Feedback Score. 
 
4.4. Data  
The hypotheses were tested using field data collected from eBay.  I chose 12 consumer 
products, whose closing prices range from around $2 to around $400.  In addition to the 
variables used to operationalize the hypotheses, various other factors might influence the 
intensity of bidding, success of the auction and closing price.  These include the nature of 
the product, starting bid price, and shipping fee. 
 Accordingly, for each product, the detailed information of the auction was 
recorded, including the seller’s feedback records, start bid price, whether the Gallery 
feature was used, whether the item was sold, final auction price and shipping fee. 
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 The total sample size was 6148, which was collected over a period of four months 
(October 2004 to January 2005).  The detailed descriptions of the data are presented in 











Condition Used New New Used Used Used 
No. of 
Observation 243 201 286 283 257 294 
Deal items 87 150 194 240 214 230 
No. of Using 
Gallery  within 
All the 
Observation 
51 49 28 93 80 124 
No. of Using 
Gallery within 
the Deal Items 
22 39 20 85 71 100 




20.98% 24.38% 9.79% 32.86% 31.28% 42.18% 
Ratio of Using 
Gallery within 
the Deal Items 
25.28% 26% 10.30% 35.42% 33.18% 43.48% 
Average Positive 
Ratio of all the 
Observation 
99.48% 99.54% 98.64% 99.62% 99.2% 98.90% 
Average Auction 
Price 2.89  7.23 7.92 17.28 31.00 37.53 
Table 4.1.1: Data Descriptions 
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Condition Used New New New new New 
No. of 
Observation 531 1329 1197 372 886 269 
Deal items 428 1143 894 252 624 192 
No. of Using 
Gallery  within 
All the 
Observation 
348 643 609 205 551 169 
No. of Using 
Gallery within 
the Deal Items 
259 537 491 140 331 105 




65.54% 48.38% 50.88% 55.11% 62.19% 62.83% 
Ratio of Using 
Gallery within 
the Deal Items 
60.51% 46.98% 54.92% 55.56% 53.04% 54.69% 
Average 
Positive Ratio 
of all the 
Observation 
98.83% 98.52% 98.199% 97.76% 95.73% 98.55% 
Average 
Auction Price 44.2560 45.0292 46.82 133.39 190.77 398.31 
Table 4.1.2: Data Descriptions 
 
A few measures were taken to improve the accuracy of data collected.  Firstly, the 
descriptions of the selling items were checked to ensure they were homogeneous.  
Secondly, auctions in which sellers used features other than Gallery were excluded.  As a 
result, the analysis of the effect of Gallery excluded the possible influence of other 
features, such as Bold or Highlight.  Thirdly, each record was of a unique seller.  This 




4.5.1. Advertising Effect 
Hypotheses 1(a)-1(c) focus on the impact of the Gallery feature on demand for the item.  
I set up equations 4.1-4.3 to analyze the impact of the Gallery feature.  By Hypotheses 
1(a)-1(c), the coefficient 3α  in equation 4.1- 4.3 should be positive and significant.  
No.of bids= Constant+ Start bid price + Shipping fee





   
                                (4.1), 
 
Success= Constant+ Start bid price + Shipping fee+ Gallery 
+ Feedback score  +
0 1 2 3
4
α α α α
α ε
 
                                 (4.2), 
Price= Constant+ Start bid price + Shipping fee + Gallery 
+ Feedback score +
0 1 2 3
4
α α α α
α ε
  
                            (4.3). 
The results are summarized in Table 4.2.  
 





































































































































































































































































***significant at the 0.01% level      **significant at the 1% level   
Table 4.2: Advertising Effect: each product category 
 
Firstly, I use the number of bids to measure the intensity of the competition.  If Gallery is 
effective in advertising, the auctions with Gallery feature should attract more bidders, and 
hence more bids.  Table 4.2, columns (i)-(ii), reports OLS estimates of equation 4.1.  In 8 
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out of 12 products, the Gallery feature was associated with a significantly higher number 
of bids, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1(a).   
 
Secondly, I test whether the Gallery feature increases the likelihood of the item being 
sold.  Table 4.2, columns (iii)-(iv), reports logit estimates of equation 4.2.  In only 2 out 
of 12 products was the coefficient of Gallery positive and significant.  Therefore, H1(b) is 
rejected.  
 
Thirdly, I examine whether Gallery can raise seller profits.  Table 4.2, columns (v)-(vi) 
reports OLS estimation of equation 4.3 on the sub-sample in which the item was sold.  In 
7 out of 12 products, the Gallery feature was associated with a significantly higher final 
auction price.  More importantly, for most products, the increase in the final auction price 
exceeds the cost of the Gallery feature ($0.35).  For instance, Gallery can increase the 
final auction price of Sony Playstation by $5.76.  Therefore, Gallery is a profitable 
advertising tool. 
 
After testing hypotheses 1(a)-1(c) in each product category, I further check them for the 
sample of the total 12 product categories, using dummy variables for the various products.  
The results are summarized in Table 4.3. 
 
 





































***significant at the 0.01% level       
Table 4.3: Advertising Effect: whole sample 
 
Firstly, I examine the impact of Gallery on the intensity of the competition for the whole 
sample.  Table 4.3, column (i), showed that the coefficient of Gallery feature was 
significant and positive.  Hence, the above finding that the Gallery feature is associated 
with a higher number of bids is strengthened. 
 
Next, the relationship between the Gallery feature and the likelihood of the item being 
sold is tested for the whole sample.  In Table 4.3, column (iii), the insignificant 
coefficient of the Gallery feature indicated that the Gallery feature was not correlated to 
the likelihood of the item being sold.  Again, H1(b) is rejected.        
 
Finally, I check how the Gallery feature affects the final auction price for the whole 
sample.  The result in Table 4.3, column (v), showed that the coefficient of Gallery 
feature was significant and positive.  Such results reconfirm that Gallery feature was 
associated with a higher final auction price.    
 
From the above results, I conclude that Gallery does serve as an advertising function.  By 
attracting the attention of buyers, auctions with the Gallery feature attract more intense 
competition, which increases the final auction price.  For most products, the increased 
final auction price is higher than the cost of the Gallery feature.  Thus, it is profitable for 
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sellers to invest in the Gallery feature.  Surprisingly, I do not find evidence that Gallery 
increases the probability that the item will be sold. 
4.5.2. Signaling Effect 
Having proved the advertising effect of Gallery, I further examine whether the Gallery 
feature serves as an effective quality signal.  If Gallery is a quality signal, as inferred by 
Hypothesis 2, sellers with a higher Positive Ratio should be more likely to use Gallery 
feature than those with lower Positive Ratio.  Therefore, the coefficient in the logit model 
4.4 should be positive and significant.  
Gallery= Constant+ Start bid price + Shipping fee






                                                (4.4). 
 
The regression results are reported in Table 4.4.  Column (ii) showed that in only 2 out of 
12 products is the coefficient of Positive Ratio negative and significant.  Hence, Gallery 
is not associated with the Positive Ratio.  H2 is rejected. 
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 Regression Function  4.4   
Sample: all 
 (i)  















































































***significant at the 0.01% level      
Table 4.4: Signaling Effect: Positive Ratio 
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A possible reason is that Positive Ratio is not a good measure to differentiate seller 
quality.  To establish trust in the community, eBay checks the users’ transaction history 
regularly and bans those with low Positive Ratio.  As a result, most sellers in eBay have 
high Positive Ratio.  From Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, one can observe that the average 
Positive Ratio of sellers is above 98%.  Buyers may not be sensitive to small differences 
in sellers’ Positive Ratio.  Consequently, Positive Ratio may not affect sellers’ choice of 
using Gallery feature.   
 
Hypothesis 3 uses the Feedback Score as a proxy for seller quality and predicts that 
sellers with higher Feedback Score have more incentive to use the Gallery feature.  By 
hypothesis 3, the coefficient 3α  in the equation 4.5 should be positive and significant.   
Gallery= Constant+ Start bid price + Shipping fee






                                                         (4.5). 
 
Table 4.5, column (ii), reports logit estimations of equation 4.5.  In 7 out of 12 products, 
the Gallery feature was associated with a higher Feedback Score.  Moreover, 5 of them 
were high-priced products.16  As a result, I infer that H3 can be accepted in the high-
priced product categories. 
                                                 
16 Since the coefficient of the Feedback Score is too small, the regression results using Spss and 
Eviews are different.  Here I report the results by Spss.  For the results by Eviews, please refer to the 
Table 4A.1 in the Appendix 4.1.  
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 Regression Function  4.5   
Sample: all 
 (i)  















































































***significant at the 0.01% level      **significant at the 1% level   
Table 4.5: Signaling Effect: Feedback Score (Spss) 
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4.6. Discussion and Conclusions                
This study provides an interpretation of the advertising and signaling behavior in eBay.  
The Gallery feature was examined to investigate the function of the optional features in 
online auction markets.  There are two main sets of findings: firstly, Gallery serves as an 
advertising function, which intensifies competition among buyers, and thus increases the 
final auction price.  In a way, these features act as value-added indications for buyers.  
However, there is no evidence that Gallery is related to the probability that the item will 
be sold.   
 Secondly, for high-priced products, I observe that sellers with a higher Feedback 
Score are more likely to choose Gallery feature than those with lower Feedback Score.  
Using Feedback Score as an indicator of seller quality, I conclude that Gallery is more 
likely to be chosen by high quality sellers, and thus, serves as a quality signal.  
 
Such results provide practical implications for the trading parties in eBay.  Sellers can be 
reminded to get an insight into the buyers’ psychology, and thus invest in the optional 
features to win the price premia.  Buyers can be informed that the Gallery feature serves 
as a quality signal for the high-priced products.  It is thus wiser for them to choose the 
auctions with Gallery.  Furthermore, the Gallery feature can help to mitigate the 
information asymmetry and establish trust between trading parties.   
 
There are a few puzzles, which need further investigation.  Firstly, the Gallery feature can 
bring extra payoff which exceeds the cost.  Since sellers can easily get past transaction 
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information in eBay, sellers should invest in the Gallery feature until the market 
equilibrium is reached, where the profit of Gallery is equal to the cost.  However, this is 
not the case I observed.   
 The possible reason is that it is hard or too costly for any individual buyer or 
seller to predict the market outcome precisely.  Far from having perfect or common 
information, subjects know only their own circumstances.  Therefore, their behaviors 
may deviate from the prediction of the economic theory. 
 Such results challenge the claim that Internet can remove market frictions, and 
will bring about a nearly perfect market (Kuttner 1998).  Although eBay provides a more 
transparent market than the conventional one, the efficient market or frictionless market 
has not been realized yet.  
 
The second puzzle is that signaling effect is observed in high-priced products rather than 
low-priced products.  Since the cost of the Gallery feature is fixed for all the products, the 
possible loss from a fake signal is comparatively higher for low-priced products than 
high-priced products.  It is thus expected that signal effect should be more widespread in 
low-priced products.  However, the real data show the opposite pattern. 
 
A possible explanation, as according to Smith and Szidarovszky (1999) is that 
individuals’ behavior will more closely match the prediction of rational-behavior theories 
when the stakes of the decision increase, and the decision costs decrease.  With the 
increase of the product price, the decision cost of choosing Gallery or not is 
comparatively low.  Hence, it is expected that sellers’ behavior will be consistent with the 
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prediction of the signaling theory.  Such results indicate that the prediction of the 
signaling theory and the empirical testing has discrepancy, which need to be reconciled 
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Appendix 4.1.  Signaling Effect (Eviews) 
 Regression Function  (8)   
Sample: all 
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***significant at the 0.01% level      **significant at the 1% level   
Table 4A.1: Signaling Effect: Feedback Score (Eviews) 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this chapter, I will briefly review the results of these three essays, and propose a few 
possible directions for future research.     
 
5.1. Competition between Open Source and Proprietary Software 
In the second chapter, I focused on competition between open source and proprietary 
software.  When facing an open source competitor, the producer of the proprietary 
software must decide on compatibility.  On the one hand, compatibility with the open 
source software allows users of the proprietary software to share the network externality 
from the open source users.  On the other hand, incompatibility enables the proprietary 
producer to maintain monopoly power. 
 
I applied a Hotelling linear city model to study the choice between compatibility and no 
compatibility by the producer of the proprietary software.  Competition was asymmetric 
in that proprietary software aims at maximizing its profit, while open source software 
reacts passively.  The model was analyzed under two scenarios, where the market is fully 
covered and where the market is not fully covered. 
 
I found that the proprietary producer’s choice of compatibility strategy depends on the 
market coverage condition.  When the market is fully covered, two products are in severe 
competition.  Inward compatibility allows proprietary software users to share the network 
externality of open source users, while preventing open source software users from 
sharing the network externality of the proprietary software. This is the best strategy.   
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When the market is partly covered, an increase in open source software users can benefit 
proprietary software users through the network externality, without decreasing the market 
share of the proprietary software.  Therefore, two-way compatibility is a win-win strategy: 
it increases the proprietary producer’s profit, while enhancing the user base of the open 
source software, which generates positive externalities for the users of the proprietary 
software. 
 
Furthermore, the extension of the basic model showed that when the providers of the 
open source software maximize market share rather than react passively, two-way 
compatibility would be the best choice for both the proprietary software and the open 
source software. 
 
Moreover, in a scenario where initially, both providers are proprietary, and then, one 
provider changes from providing proprietary to open source software, both the market 
share and the profit of the remaining proprietary software producer will decrease.  Such a 
change may lower social welfare. 
 
Future studies may focus on three possible directions.  Firstly, the open source software 
and the proprietary software may not enter the market simultaneously.  The software that 
enters earlier will grab the consumers and have large existing network externalities.  It 
would be interesting to investigate how the installed user base affects the compatibility 
choices of the proprietary software. 
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Secondly, I assumed that consumers’ taste difference is greater than the network 
externality intensity.  If this assumption is violated, the equilibrium results are unstable.  
The switch of the marginal consumer from one software to the other makes every 
consumer follows the switch.  Such a tipping market might have different implications 
regarding the compatibility strategies, which need further investigation. 
 
Thirdly, users of the open source software may contribute to its quality.  In turn, the 
increased quality attracts more users to switch from proprietary software to open source 
software.  These two steps may feed on another.  Another competition model, which 
focuses on the quality increase of the open source software, might be built to investigate 
how the compatibility strategies of the proprietary software and network externality 
influence the quality of the open source software. 
  
5.2. IT Investment Value 
In the third chapter, I applied an event study methodology to provide a better 
understanding of IT value to firms in a developing country.  By comparing the impact of 
IT investment announcements on the firms’ stock price in China and that in the U.S., I 
found that IT investment could significantly increase the firms’ market value in China, 
while such an effect was not observed in the U.S. 
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Furthermore, the value of IT investment varied with respect to various factors.  For 
instance, in China, IT value was more likely to create value in manufacturing than non-
manufacturing industries, and, in IT-using firms than IT-producing firms.  
 
Previous studies applied the event study methodology to study the value of IT investment 
in the U.S.  However, all yielded negative results (Dos Santos et al. 1993, Im et al. 2001).  
This essay is the first one to report positive evidence of the value of IT investment, but 
for a sample of Chinese rather than U.S. businesses.  The difference in results between 
China and the U.S. strongly suggests that IT investments may have different impacts in 
developing countries as contrasted with developed countries. 
 
This essay enriches the limited research of IT value in developing counties.  IT is proved 
to bring a better payoff in a developing country than in a developed country, and thus 
could be a bigger opportunity in developing countries.   
 
5.3. Advertising and Signaling Behavior in eBay 
In the fourth chapter, I studied advertising and signaling behavior on eBay.  Major online 
auction markets provide optional features, such as Gallery and Bold, for sellers to 
promote the items for sale.  These optional features have two possible functions.  One is 
advertising, which attracts the attention of potential bidders.  The other is a signal of 
quality, by which sellers can communicate private quality information. 
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To distinguish these two possible functions, field data were collected from eBay on sales 
and sellers’ use of the Gallery feature.  The results showed that the Gallery feature serves 
as an advertising tool.  Auctions with the Gallery feature exhibited more intense 
competition and ended with a higher price.  Moreover, for relatively high-priced products, 
sellers with higher feedback score were more likely to choose the Gallery feature than 
those with lower feedback score.  Thus, Gallery can be deemed as a quality signal, which 
helps to establish trust between buyers and sellers. 
 
This study has several empirical implications: firstly, these optional features are proved 
to be profitable advertising tools.  Hence, sellers can use them to win price premia.  
Secondly, for the relatively high-priced product, these optional features may help buyers 
to get more information about sellers’ quality and reduce the risk in online transaction.  
Thirdly, online market managers could be aware of the advertising and signaling 
functions of these optional features.  Hence, they may provide more effective features, 
such as video clips, to smooth the transaction in the online market.   
 
The results present a few puzzles, which need further investigation: firstly, the increased 
final auction price due to the Gallery feature exceeds the cost.  Hence, it might be 
interesting to study the reason why some sellers do not invest in the Gallery feature to get 
the price premium.  Secondly, the signal effect is more likely to be observed in relatively 
high-priced product categories than low-priced ones.  Such an observation contradicts the 
theoretical prediction that signals with a relatively higher cost are more credible, and thus, 
needs to be reconciled by further research. 
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There are two other possible directions for future study.  Firstly, the signaling behavior 
could be further investigated by using more expensive optional features, such as Bold or 
Highlight.  As mentioned in the essay, the condition for an effective signal is that the 
signaling cost should be high enough to deter the low quality seller.  Hence, with the 
increase of the cost of optional features, sellers’ behavior should be more likely to fit with 
the prediction of the signaling theory. 
 
However, in eBay, few sellers choose high-priced features.  Thus, I need a comparatively 
longer time period to collect sufficient data for valid statistical tests.  Because of the time 
limitation, in the essay, I choose the Gallery feature, which is cheap and chosen by quite 
a few sellers.  The result showed that the signaling effect can only be observed in high-
priced product categories.  Future work could focus on features that are more expensive 
and may get better results. 
 
The second possible future work is related to the bidders’ behavior.  During the data 
collection process, I found an interesting phenomenon: early bidding for each auction 
always exists.  EBay applies the second price auction, which lasts for a fixed period, 
normally 3 or 5 days.  The auction theory predicts that the optimal strategy for each 
bidder is to bid the true value.  In such an auction, early bidding will disclose the bidder’s 
private information to the competitors without bringing any extra payoff.  Moreover, last 
minute bidding, which is called “sniffing”, may successfully deter the other bidders from 
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increasing their bids, and hence, bring benefits.  It would be interesting to find the 
underlying economic or psychological reasons for the early bidding behavior. 
 
One possible explanation is proposed by Klemperer (2003).  He believes that the early 
bidding can be the result of collusion among bidders.  In ascending auctions, bidders can 
use the early rounds, when prices are still low, to signal their views about who should win 
which objects, and then, when consensus has been reached, tacitly agree to stop bidding 
the price up.  However, considering the vast number of the potential bidders in eBay, it 
would be surprising if collusion could work, especially for the common consumer 
products.  Future study should investigate whether the early bidder is the final winner of 
the auction, which would then test Klemperer’s collusion theory.   
 
5.4. Conclusions  
This thesis has provided three studies, that applied economic theory, modeling and 
empirical methods to study issues associated with IT and its application in electronic 
markets.  The economic methods provide prediction and explanation for various 
phenomena.  These are effective tools for IS scholars in addressing challenging research 
questions.  It can be expected that economics will continue to play a key role in the 
development of IS research. 
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